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I. INTRODUCTION
When one contemplates the universe of human rights violations,
intellectual property rights probably are not first, or even tenth, on the
list of things that come to mind. Human rights violations usually call to
mind such things as violence against a civilian populace by government
authorized (or government incited) forces, suppression of unpopular
views, violations of fundamental due process rights, especially regarding
criminal trials, and so on. If one contemplates economic issues at all
under the rubric of human rights, it probably will be in the form of a
population living in poverty, educational deprivations, and the like,
again normally perpetrated (or neglected) in some manner by persons
acting on behalf of or at the behest of a government. Private harms of
the sort normally at issue in intellectual property situations ordinarily are
not the stuff of human rights issues. 1 Thus, you may be surprised to
1. This is not to say that intellectual property issues do not involve government action.
Some intellectual property problems clearly do involve governmental agencies, whose approval
may be required before certain intellectual property rights come into existence. In the United States,
patents must be issued by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) before patent rights exist and
PTO review is required before trademark registrations are issued. Trademark rights in the United
States can exist without governmental approval, though certain trademark rights accrue only upon
registration. In other countries, trademark rights exist only after registration with the government.
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learn that human rights agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, contain express provisions favoring the existence of
intellectual property rights.2 You may be equally surprised to learn that
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), the designated arbiter
of claims brought against countries for violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights (the “Convention”), has heard a number
of cases involving intellectual property rights, including cases brought
by corporate entities.3 In our globalized economy intellectual property
rights holders have begun to invoke human rights laws and treaties to
protect their interests.4 These uses of human rights agreements raise a
number of interesting and potentially troubling questions, especially for
the future of human rights enforcement. The purpose of this paper is to
examine some of those questions.
This article focuses on one human rights treaty, the Convention,
and the possible uses of its provisions to secure and expand intellectual
property rights (“IP rights”). Although the Convention does not contain
any provision specifically referencing IP rights, it does contain several
provisions that could be used to expand IP rights. Furthermore, the
existence of a substantial body of interpretive case law from the ECHR
affords us a more detailed perspective on the manner in which the
Convention could be used to further IP rights. Finally, the group of
countries adhering to the Convention, though all part of Europe,
represent a somewhat diverse collection of governments, from the U.K.
to Germany, to the Czech Republic, to the former constituent states of
the Soviet Union (including Russia), to Turkey. Although not
completely representative of a range of possible human rights
viewpoints, it is a sufficiently diverse group to provide a useful window
into the problem. 5

See, e.g., C. PROP. INTELL. 712-1 (Fr.). Copyrights in U.S. works must be registered with the
Copyright Office before a suit is initiated. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
2. Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documen
ts/udhr (last visited July 20, 2011).
3. See, e.g., Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03, ¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2008)
(HUDOC); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007)
(Grand Chamber).
4. Intellectual property is not the only strange bedfellow with human rights. Hedge funds
threatened to go to the ECHR if Greece were to default on its debts. Landon Thomas Jr., Hedge
Funds May Sue Greece if it Tries to Force Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at B1.
5. See Wojciech Sadurski, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalization of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council
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In a 2008 article, Professor Laurence Helfer outlined several
possible frameworks that the ECHR might use to review intellectual
property disputes under one provision of the Convention: Article 1 of the
First Protocol. 6 I do not propose to challenge either Professor Helfer’s
premises or his concerns that certain approaches to the problem by the
ECHR could have untoward consequences for the stability of IP rights
and for human rights enforcement.7 However, I do intend to suggest
several ways that the ECHR could become enmeshed in IP rights
disputes, not only under Article 1, but under other provisions of the
Convention, such as Article 8 (dealing with rights of privacy) and
Article 10 (dealing with free speech and free press). I will suggest that
the ECHR’s case law makes it increasingly likely that IP rights holders
and potential rights holders will invoke the Convention to secure and
expand IP rights. I do so not from a conviction that the ECHR should be
involved in such matters, or that the court should expand IP rights, but
because I believe that the ECHR’s involvement is inevitable and that its
precedent makes IP rights expansion not unlikely. Thus, to the extent
that human rights advocates believe that such involvement by the ECHR
will have negative consequences, this article can serve as a wake-up call
to the possible world that lies ahead.
The article begins with a brief examination of the Convention,
followed by a discussion of provisions relevant to IP rights and some
recent cases in the ECHR that raised the issue of using human rights
provisions in an intellectual property context. Building on these cases
and provisions, the article raises the following issues: (1) In what ways
could the Convention be interpreted to expand or even create particular
IP rights?; (2) Will the use of the Convention in these situations have
unforeseen effects on IP rights as they are now understood?; (3) Who are
the likely beneficiaries of the use of the Convention in intellectual
property cases?; (4) What effect could the use of the Convention have on
attempts to create a more global intellectual property law?; and (5)
of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments (Nov. 4, 2008) (unpublished Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 08/135, University of Sydney Law School) at 4, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295652 (noting the diversity of the European Union).
6. Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the
European Court of Human Rights, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2008). As explained more fully below,
Article 1 of the First Protocol is a Convention provision that protects property rights. It is
somewhat analogous to the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution, but has important
differences as well. U.S. CONST., amend. V. For a more general discussion of human rights and IP
rights see Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a
Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6, at 51-52.
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Could such uses weaken human rights protections in more traditional
situations?
II. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: BACKGROUND
AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS
A.

Background

The European Convention on Human Rights arose from the rubble
of World War II and the human rights abuses during the period from the
end of World War I to the end of World War II. In May, 1949, ten
countries signed the Treaty of London, establishing the Council of
Europe. 8 A year and a half later, in November, 1950, the members of
the Council signed what is formally known as the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms—the European
Human Rights Convention. 9 The Convention has been amended by
fourteen protocols since its inception, adding to the list of rights
protected. 10 The Convention is administered by the Council of Europe. 11
The Convention now has forty-seven signatories, half of which
have been added since the beginning of 1990.12 All of the members of
the European Union are also members of the Council of Europe and
adhere to the Convention. 13 The potential reach of the Convention is
thus much broader than the European Union. Although the Council of
Europe does not have enforcement mechanisms as robust as those of the
EU, this does not leave the Convention impotent. The Council has its
own judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights, based in
8. See The Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=datesCles&l=en (last visited May 2, 2013).
9. European Human Rights Convention, Sep. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
Convention]. The text of the Convention can be found at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treatie
s/Html/005.htm (last visited May 2, 2013). The United Nations already had promulgated the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2, in 1948. See History of the Document, THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml (last
visited Oct. 8, 2012).
10. See Treaty Office, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012).
11. The Council has a web site providing a portal for its activities. See www.coe.int (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012).
12. Many of the new members, including Russia, were former Soviet Bloc countries, or were
part of the former Soviet Union. See 47 Counties, One Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
13. Great Britain has incorporated the Convention into its Human Rights Act 1998—at least
regarding actions of public authorities. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15
(H.L.) [¶ 49]; Human Rights Act, 1988, c. 42 (U.K.).
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Strasbourg, France. 14 The Strasbourg Court 15 hears cases brought by
individuals against countries alleged to have violated the Convention, 16
and issues written decisions that include a rationale. Although the
ECHR has no direct enforcement vehicle, members of the Council of
Europe (whose members are contracting parties to the Convention) have
agreed to abide by the Court’s decisions. 17 And, to a great extent, it
appears that they do so, at least in Western Europe.18
The Convention also influences European law through
implementation of the Convention into the domestic law of various
countries. Great Britain’s 1998 Human Rights Act did so, and its courts
have looked to the decisions of the ECHR for interpretive guidance.19
Although the EU has not adopted the Convention as EU law, its
principles have been incorporated into the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”). 20 Both of these mechanisms tend to make the
Convention a part of the legal regimes of member countries.21
14. The Court was created in 1959. Prior to November 1, 1998, human rights complaints
were handled in the first instance by the Commission on Human Rights, which was created in 1954.
COURT
OF
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
See
The
Court
in
Brief,
EUROPEAN
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6404AAF5BC585/0/Brochure_en_bref_EN.pdf (last visited July 21, 2011). It was not until Protocol
#11 was adopted in 1998 that a full-time court was established and that member states were required
to allow individual complaints to be brought against them (previously the country had to consent to
such suits) as opposed to complaints by one member country against another.
15. For convenience and to distinguish it from the European Court of Justice, I will
sometimes refer to the European Court of Human Rights as the Strasbourg Court.
16. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34. Article 34 of the Convention gives individuals the
right to bring actions in the ECHR. Article 33 gives member countries the right to “refer to the
Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention” by another member country. Id. at
art. 33.
17. See id. at art. 39, ¶ 4 (dealing with friendly settlements); Id. at art. 46, ¶ 2 (dealing with
judgments). The Committee of Ministers of the Council is responsible for the execution of the
ECHR’s judgments. It maintains a Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court. The
Committee can refer cases to the ECHR if, inter alia, a country is refusing to abide by a judgment.
18. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H. R. July 28, 2005)
(Judgment—Just Satisfaction—Friendly Settlement) (HUDOC) (Germany agrees to pay €115,000
in compensation and expenses). Moreover, to the extent that Convention member countries wish to
join the EU, their willingness to abide by the ECHR’s interpretation of the Convention no doubt will
be relevant to the admission decision. Many countries directly implement the ECHR’s judgments.
OF
EUROPE,
See
Execution
of
Judgments
of
the
ECHR,
COUNCIL
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
19. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 (H.L.) [254-55]; Ferdinand v. MGN
Ltd., [2011] EWHC 2454 (Q.B.).
20. See, e.g., Andrew Williams, Human Rights and the European Court of Justice: Past and
Present Tendencies (Apr. 5, 2011) (unpublished Legal Studies Research Paper No.2011-06,
University of Warwick School of Law) at 5, 9-11, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1803138.
21. But cf. Murray v. Express Newspapers plc, [2007] EWHC 1908 [¶¶ 60-62] (Ch.D.)
(British courts are bound to follow House of Lords decisions in cases of conflict with European
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Pertinent Provisions of the Convention for IP Rights

Undoubtedly, the ECHR influences the laws of member states. But
this still leaves the question: what is the connection between the
Convention and intellectual property? To answer this question, we need
to identify provisions of the Convention pertinent to IP rights and
discuss the methodology used by the ECHR to decide cases brought
under those provisions.
Because we are discussing intellectual property, it seems sensible to
start with a provision dealing with property rights. The Convention
contains such a provision, namely Article 1 of the First Protocol, which
provides as follows:
Protection of Property:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law
and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control
the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure
22
the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.

Article 1 23 looks a bit like the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 24 That is, it appears to protect against a
governmental appropriation of property. The Constitution refers to
“private property” being “taken” while Article 1 refers to “peaceful
enjoyment of . . . possessions.” These are not necessarily identical
concepts, although, as indicated in the discussion below, the concept of a
“possession” is very similar to “property.” 25 It may seem a stretch to
apply Article 1 to intangible intellectual property rights; however, it is
notable that the United States Supreme Court has applied the Takings
Clause to intellectual property. 26 Article 1 was the focus of Professor
Court of Human Rights decisions).
22. See Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, art. 1.
23. References to “Article 1” should be presumed to refer to Article 1, First Protocol, unless
otherwise specified.
24. The Takings Clause provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V.
25. The concept of a “possession” under Article 1 is discussed infra text at notes 123 to 136.
It is also worth noting that the title of Article 1 refers to “property,” even if the text of the provision
does not.
26. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (trade secrets treated as
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Helfer’s discussion of the ECHR’s approach to IP rights disputes. 27 The
ECHR has held that Article 1 is applicable to IP rights,28 and Article 1
will play an important role in the analysis to be presented here.
However, there are two other provisions of the Convention that are less
directly related to property rights, but whose interpretation may have a
significant impact on IP rights and on the application of Article 1 to IP
cases. Those two provisions are Article 8 and Article 10 of the
Convention, which provide, respectively, as follows:
Article 8—Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
29
others.
Article 10—Freedom of expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
property under the Takings Clause). But cf. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349-53
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (patentee could not use Takings Clause as basis for claim against government for
using patented invention).
27. Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6.
28. See, e.g., Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03, ¶¶ 34-35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2008)
(copyright); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11,
2005) (Chamber opinion); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan.
11, 2007) (Grand Chamber) (trademark registration application).
29. See Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8.
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disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
30
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

At first glance, it might not appear that these articles have any
direct connection with intellectual property. Article 10, the rough
analogue to the First Amendment in the United States, clearly could limit
IP rights, but it seems an unlikely source for creating or expanding them.
However, as discussed below, the manner in which the right to free
expression is interpreted may make it less of a barrier to IP rights than
one might believe, and may make it a source of IP rights. Article 8,
particularly subsection 2, appears to afford protection from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. Nevertheless, as will be seen, Article 8 is a
broader and more affirmative right than it may appear on its face,
possibly giving rise to IP rights. 31
These three provisions form the basis of the argument that the
Convention may be used to expand intellectual property rights.
III. KEY PRINCIPLES FOR IP RIGHTS EXPANSION
A.

Starting Points: Von Hannover v. Germany—The ECHR’s
Decision

Although it might seem more logical to begin with Article 1, the
property rights provision, I prefer to begin with Article 8, because its
jurisprudence affects the analysis of other provisions, including Article
10 and Article 1. One decision from the ECHR in particular brought
privacy issues to the forefront of IP rights and related rights, and
provides a convenient starting point for the discussion of the ECHR’s
analytical framework. That case, Von Hannover v. Germany, 32 was a
suit by Princess Caroline of Monaco, complaining that photographers
were invading her privacy by taking (and publishing) pictures of her and
her family in various non-official public and private settings.
In Von Hannover, Princess Caroline of Monaco, who lives most of
the time in Paris, complained about a number of photographs published
by three German magazines. 33 The photographs included several of her
30. Id. at art. 10.
31. See infra Part III. B.
32. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004). As
discussed below, there was a second Von Hannover case in the ECHR, decided eight years later. It
also dealt with photographs taken of Princess Caroline and her family. Von Hannover v. Germany
(no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012).
33. The pictures were taken while the Princess was in France, where she maintains an
apartment. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶ 8. However, they were published by German
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with her children, some of her in public places, one in a restaurant (with
a boyfriend), and some taken of her while she was on vacation.34 She
sued the publications in the German courts, claiming violations of her
right to privacy, her rights to control her image under the German
Copyright Act, and, perhaps notably, her personality rights under the
German Basic Law. 35 The trial court and first level appellate court ruled
that German law did not grant relief because of Princess Caroline’s
status as a kind of public figure. 36 On further appeal, the court ruled that
the photos of her in the restaurant—as a “secluded place” —were a
violation of her right to privacy, but that the others were not. 37 From this
ruling Princess Caroline appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany, 38 whose ruling the ECHR quoted at some length.
The Federal Constitutional Court issued what was considered a
landmark decision, ruling that, although publication of some of the
pictures in question violated Princess Caroline’s right to privacy, several
others did not. 39 In its ruling, the Federal Constitutional Court balanced
her right to privacy under German law against the right of free
expression found in the German Basic Law. 40 In its opinion, the court
specifically held that entertainment is worthy of protection under the
concept of free expression. 41 It also held that the press was entitled to a
certain “margin of manoeuvre” to decide what is in the public interest to
print. 42 Applying these principles, the court found that some of the
periodicals. Id. at ¶ 10.
34. Id. at ¶¶ 11-17.
35. Id. at ¶ 18. It is also interesting that her suit—in German courts—sought relief against
the publications under French law. Id. at ¶ 19.
36. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 21. The German court found her to be a figure “par excellence.” Id. at ¶¶
19, 21, 23. The courts enjoined republication of the photographs in France, but under French law.
Id. at ¶ 19.
37. Id. at ¶ 23.
38. Id. at ¶ 24.
39. Id. at ¶ 25.
40. Id. at ¶ 25 (¶ 1 of the quoted portion of the Constitutional Court’s opinion).
41. Id. at ¶ 25 (quoting from paragraph (b) of the Constitutional Court’s opinion). A portion
of the German court’s opinion was as follows:
The fact that the press fulfills the function of forming public opinion does not exclude entertainment
from the functional guarantee under the Basic Law. The formation of opinions and entertainment
are not opposites. Entertainment also plays a role in the formation of opinions. It can sometimes
even stimulate or influence the formation of opinions more than purely factual information.
Moreover, there is a growing tendency in the media to do away with the distinction between
information and entertainment both as regards press coverage generally and individual
contributions, and to disseminate information in the form of entertainment or mix it with
entertainment (“infotainment”). Consequently, many readers obtain information they consider to be
important or interesting from entertaining coverage.
42. Id.at ¶25 (quoting from paragraph (a) of the German Constitutional Court opinion).
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pictures, taken while she was with her children and in secluded areas,
were overly intrusive. 43 Others, however, even some in semi-private
locations, were deemed legitimate because of her status as a public
figure. 44 After further rounds of proceedings in the German courts, the
earlier results were reaffirmed. 45 Dissatisfied with the German courts’
resolution, Princess Caroline took her case to the European Court of
Human Rights. That court ruled in her favor.46
Much like the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, the ECHR
considered the matter to require balancing the right to privacy, found in
Article 8 of the Convention, and the right to free expression, found in
Article 10. 47 Notably, although the ECHR quoted extensively from the
opinions of the German courts (the lower courts as well as the Federal
Constitutional Court), it gave little if any deference to the balance
between privacy and free expression drawn by the German courts, using
rights under German law analogous to those provided by the
Convention. 48 The German courts emphasized Caroline’s status as a
public figure. Moreover, the German courts held that free press rights
encompass entertainment as well as “hard” news. In their view, this
afforded the press more leeway in its reporting. By contrast, the ECHR
accorded little credence to the public figure status of the Princess, noting
that she had few public duties as a princess, and that the pictures were
not reflective of those duties. 49 Instead, the court found that the pictures
simply satisfied the public’s curiosity about the lifestyle of a princess,
which the court believed was an insufficient basis to override her right to
privacy. 50 Thus, the court found in favor of Princess Caroline and
against the state of Germany (the ECHR issues judgments against
43. Id. at ¶ 25.
44. Id. at ¶ 25 (Constitutional Court’s opinion).
45. Id. at ¶¶ 19-38.
46. Id. at ¶¶ 78-80.
47. Id. at ¶ 58.
48. The issue of the proper level of deference—called a “margin of appreciation” by the
ECHR—is discussed infra Part IV.
49. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64 (“The situation here does not come within the sphere of any political or
public debate because the published photos and accompanying commentaries relate exclusively to
details of the applicant’s private life.”).
50. Id. at ¶¶ 65-66 (“The Court considers that the publication of the photos and articles in
question, of which the sole purpose was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding
the details of the applicant’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general
interest to society despite the applicant being known to the public. In these conditions freedom of
expression calls for a narrower interpretation.”); id. at ¶¶ 72-74, 77 (“The Court considers that the
public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing where the applicant is and how she behaves
generally in her private life even if she appears in places that cannot always be described as
secluded and despite the fact that she is well known to the public.”).
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Convention member states). 51
B.

Von Hannover as a Basis for Creating Privately Enforceable
Rights: the Affirmative Obligations of Member Countries to
Enforce the Convention

The right to privacy and its supremacy (at least in some contexts)
over free expression may lead directly to an IP right, namely the right of
publicity. In the United States, the right of publicity, which is now
widely recognized as a property right, had its origins in the tort concept
of the right to privacy. 52 And it may be, as discussed below, that the
ECHR’s privacy decisions will ripen into a property right protectable
under Article 1, as well as Article 8. However, the importance of the
Von Hannover decision transcends its basic result. The opinion provides
a framework that bridges the gap between human rights as a protection
against unwarranted governmental intrusion and human rights as a
vehicle to remedy harms perpetrated by private actors. The intrusion of
which Princess Caroline complained was not in any way the product of
state action directed against her. It was an entirely private intrusion.
Although her suit in the ECHR was against the German government, the
gravamen of her lawsuit was a dispute between private parties—her
lawsuit in the German courts was against various publications.
Essentially, her claim in the ECHR was that German law did not afford
her sufficient protection against private intrusions, and therefore the
German government was not protecting her privacy as required by
Article 8 of the Convention. By ruling in favor of Princess Caroline, the
ECHR effectively created an affirmative right from Article 8, rather than
simply a negative right. In other words, Article 8 did not just protect
Princess Caroline from governmental intrusions (a negative right); it
required the government to shield her from the intrusions of others, even
to the extent of providing an appropriate civil action in its courts (an
affirmative right). 53 The imposition of an affirmative obligation on the
51. Id. at ¶ 80. The ECHR was asked to issue a judgment for approximately €142,800, but
reserved the question of damages for later decision. Id. at ¶ 85. A settlement of the judgment in the
amount of €115,000 was later recorded. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. July 28, 2005) (Just Satisfaction—Friendly Settlement).
52. See e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.3d 425 (Cal. 1979) (rights of publicity arose
from privacy tort); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(b) (West 2013) (recognizing a property right); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-761(G) (2007) (soldier’s right of publicity); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
1075/15 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1448(B) (West 2013).
53. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶ 57 (“The boundary between the State’s positive
and negative obligations under this provision does not lend itself to precise definition. The
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country to effectuate the right is a marked contrast to the Bill of Rights
jurisprudence in the United States, which requires some form of state
action in order for its provisions to be invoked. 54 It is also a critical
bridge between a system focusing on state actions and a system that
contemplates the creation of new obligations without the necessity of
state action. Thus, if the effectuation of the rights granted by the
Convention requires a country to enact legislation (or create common
law) that grants a cause of action to one private party injured by another
private party, then the ECHR becomes a vehicle to effectuate those
obligations. To put the matter into IP rights language, if the effectuation
of any of the provisions of the Convention requires the creation or
expansion of IP rights, then the ECHR will issue judgments that
effectively require such creation or expansion.55
Moreover, there does not appear to be any textual reason why such
an affirmative obligation would not be imposed with regard to the
effectuation of any of the rights granted under Article 10 or Article 1,
First Protocol. The first sentence of Article 8, which grants the right to
privacy, does not invoke any notion of state action. It simply says that
everyone is entitled to privacy. 56 Similarly, Article 10 states that
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression,” 57 and Article 1
states that “[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions.” 58 There is no textual invocation of any
state action or any indication that the right only insures against instances
of state interference.59

applicable principles are, nonetheless, similar.”).
54. The affirmative obligation of states under Article 8 and other Convention provisions has
been reaffirmed by the ECHR. See Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶98
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012) (Grand Chamber); Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, ¶75
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10, 2007) (Grand Chamber).
55. Von Hannover, App. No. 59320/00 at ¶57. The ECHR cannot directly order states to
enact legislation. However, as noted earlier, an arm of the Council of Europe oversees compliance
with the court’s judgments and will inquire about legislation needed to effectuate the court’s ruling.
OF
EUROPE,
See
A
unique
and
effective
mechanism,
COUNCIL
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 2012).
56. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8.
57. Id. at art. 10.
58. Id. at protocol 1, art. 1.
59. The second paragraph of each of these provisions, like that of Article 8, allows the state
certain leeway to protect other rights and interests by imposing some limitations on privacy, free
expression, and property rights. But that does not eliminate the affirmative obligation created by the
first paragraph. See, e.g., Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010)
(alluding to affirmative obligations under Article 1).
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Von Hannover and the Balance of Free Expression and Privacy

The right to free expression is often a significant limitation on IP
rights, including rights of celebrities. The ECHR’s treatment of the free
expression argument in Von Hannover demonstrates that under the
Convention, speech in a commercial context may not be given
particularly strong protection.60 Since many IP cases implicate free
speech concerns, this development would favor the rights of IP owners
over the rights of unauthorized users. On the other hand, an affirmative
obligation to promote freedom of expression could be invoked to create
IP rights that further such expression.
The Von Hannover decision may not appear to be an IP case at all;
it could be viewed as an ordinary tort case. Even without the right of
publicity overtones, however, the case would be of interest to IP lawyers
for several reasons. The decision made clear that the right of free
expression does not trump other rights under the Convention. When two
rights are potentially at odds, as in Von Hannover, the court must
balance them, giving due regard for the ECHR’s view of the general
societal values at stake. Although, as discussed further below, the
ECHR often gives member state decisions a certain degree of
deference—called a “margin of appreciation”61—in the case of Von
Hannover, the court showed very little inclination to defer to the German
courts’ own balancing of the rights, even though the balance struck by
the German courts was not patently unreasonable.62 Moreover, the right
to know about (and perhaps make use of) facts of a celebrity’s life was
expressly deemed to have relatively little weight in the free expression
balance. 63
Subsequently, the ECHR expounded on the role of free expression
in several cases involving celebrity photographs, including a second case

60. Id. at ¶¶ 59, 63-64. In addition to its statements in Von Hannover, the ECHR’s attitude
toward commercial speech can be found in some of its unfair competition cases. See generally
Maya Hertig Randall, Commercial Speech Under the European Convention on Human Rights:
Subordinate or Equal?, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53 (2006).
61. See infra Part IV. Cf. A v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, ¶ 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9,
2009); Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, ¶77 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 10, 2007) (Grand
Chamber).
62. The margin of appreciation can also reflect the ECHR’s view of the existence of a
European consensus on the issue. See Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 124 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011) (granting a greater margin of appreciation to the state’s refusal to act where
there was no European consensus on whether the press must give advance notice of intent to publish
a story about a prominent figure).
63. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, ¶65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004.
Accord Mosley, App. No. 48009/08 at ¶114.
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brought by Princess Caroline (and her husband). 64 In one case, the
ECHR found a violation of Article 10, where a newspaper was prevented
from publishing a picture of an actor together with articles concerning
his arrest and guilty plea on charges of drug possession. 65 But this case
involved the press’s oversight function vis a vis the criminal process and
can be distinguished from Von Hannover (no. 1). In another case, the
ECHR upheld a decision of the British House of Lords 66 that prevented
publication of photographs of model Naomi Campbell arriving at a drug
rehabilitation facility. 67 In a second Von Hannover case, the ECHR
upheld the German courts’ decision to allow publication of a picture of
Princess Caroline and her husband at St. Moritz together with an article
about her then-ailing father and the contrast with her sister’s decision to
stay with the father. 68 The ECHR propounded five factors relevant to
the balancing process: (1) the contribution to a debate of general interest;
(2) how well known the person is and what is the subject of the report;
(3) prior conduct of the person concerned; (4) content, form and
consequences of the publication; and (5) circumstances in which the
photos were taken. 69 Although these factors clarify the proper
methodology, they do not materially alter the boundaries of protection
from the first Von Hannover decision. In the second Von Hannover
case, the ECHR stressed the informative value of the article and noted
that the German courts had prevented publication of photographs that
were less informative. 70 Thus, the impact of the first Von Hannover
decision apparently was to narrow Germany’s previously broader
tolerance of press intrusion into the lives of public figures.
Although the later cases stressed the importance of the press in a
democratic society, they do not appear to have markedly altered the
64. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012)
(Grand Chamber); Axel Springer A.G. v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012)
(Grand Chamber); MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 18,
2011).
65. Axel Springer, at ¶¶ 10-15, 110-111. The actor’s name was not revealed by the court; he
was referred to as person X.
66. In 2009, the House of Lords was replaced by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
as the supreme judicial body of the country. See History, THE SUPREME COURT (UK),
www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
67. MGN Ltd., App. No. 39401/04 at ¶10, 156. The ECHR did find a violation of Article 10
in another aspect of the case—the amount of “success fees” (legal fees) of Naomi Campbell
imposed on MGN. Id. at ¶¶218-220. Cf. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. May 10, 2011) (declining to mandate that celebrities be informed in advance of any potentially
damaging publications).
68. Von Hannover (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08 at ¶¶ 15-20.
69. Id. at ¶¶ 108-113.
70. Id. at ¶¶ 118-126.
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perception that entertainment news is considered of lesser value than
other news. 71
IV. THE DEFERENCE AFFORDED MEMBER STATES: MARGIN OF
APPRECIATION
The doctrine of margin of appreciation is the ECHR’s mechanism
for affording deference to the state in the manner of its implementation
of the Convention. The doctrine is fraught with potential difficulties.72
If too much deference is given, it undercuts the universality of human
rights guarantees and could allow countries to carry out seriously unfair
policies that flout the spirit of the Convention. On the other hand,
refusing to give deference in some circumstances cannot undermine
important social and cultural values embedded in the legal norms of
member countries. In practice, the doctrine appears to be unevenly
applied. As discussed above, in the first Von Hannover case, the ECHR
did not afford Germany any meaningful margin of appreciation for the
German courts’ balancing of privacy and free expression. Yet, in other
privacy cases, the court has afforded countries a significant margin of
appreciation. 73 The ECHR has identified one factor as being particularly

71. MGN, Ltd., App. No. 39401/04 at ¶¶ 139, 143 (“The Court considers the publication of
the photographs and articles, the sole purpose of which is to satisfy the curiosity of a particular
readership regarding the details of a public figure’s private life, cannot be deemed to contribute to
any debate of general interest to society.”); Axel Springer A.G., App. No. 39954/08 at ¶ 78
(“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society.”), Id.
at ¶¶ 82-84 (discussing limits on Article 10, particularly those of Article 8). The ECHR continued
this trend in Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013), where it rejected a
claim that France violated Article 10 by prosecuting the petitioners for posting photographs of a
fashion show online. The Court specifically noted that France’s actions were consistent with
protecting the intellectual property of the fashion creators (fashions are protected by French
copyright law), and that the state has greater leeway where the expression is for a commercial
purpose. Id. at ¶¶ 39-42. See Hertel v. Switzerland, Case No. 59/1997/843/1049, ¶ 47 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Aug. 25, 1998) (while finding a violation of Article 10, Court said “a margin of appreciation is
particularly essential in commercial matters, especially in an area as complex and fluctuating as that
of unfair competition.”).
72. For further discussions of the issue, see, e.g., Paul Gallagher, The European Convention
on Human Rights and the Margin of Appreciation (University College Dublin Law, Criminology &
Socio-legal Studies, Working Research Paper No. 52/2011, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 1982661); Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the
Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Universal Human Rights,
15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391 (2001).
73. See, e.g., Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/08, ¶¶ 79, 81, 90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr.
10, 2007) (state’s decision concerning destruction of stored embryos conceived via in vitro
fertilization given “wide” margin of appreciation); Schalk v. Austria, App. No. 30141/04, ¶¶ 105108 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2010) (state afforded margin of appreciation regarding same-sex
marriage); A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579, ¶ 185 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2010) (state
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important in the margin of appreciation—the existence or lack of a
European consensus on the matter.74 Also identified as factors are the
importance of the right to “an individual’s existence or identity,” which
narrows the margin, and the need “to strike a balance between
competing private and public interests or Convention rights,” which
broadens the margin. 75 But Von Hannover (no. 1) involved just such a
competing rights circumstances with little evidence of a margin of
appreciation. 76 And in A, B, C v. Ireland, 77 the ECHR deferred to
Ireland’s law on abortion rights despite an apparent European consensus
to the contrary. 78
In property rights cases, there is a greater mention of the margin of
appreciation, and some cases indicate a wider margin exists in such
situations. 79 However, the implementation of the margin of appreciation
has not been particularly consistent in property rights cases, either. In
two cases where a retroactive application of law deprived applicants of
certain legal claims, the ECHR found violations of Article 1, despite
acknowledging the margin of appreciation given to the state.80 In
another case, a Chamber of the court found a violation where the
applicant was deprived of its property by Britain’s adverse possession
law, noting that the “wide” margin of appreciation may be overcome by
a lack of “fair balance” and proportionality. 81 The Grand Chamber,
afforded margin of appreciation regarding right to abortion).
74. See, e.g., Schalk, App. No. 30141/04 at ¶ 98; Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No.
48009/08 ¶ 124 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011).
75. Evans, App. No. 6339/08 at ¶ 77.
76. In the second Von Hannover case, there was a more extensive discussion of the margin of
appreciation, particularly in a competing rights situation. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App.
No. 40660/08, ¶¶104-07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7, 2012). Ultimately, the German courts’ balancing
was upheld in the second instance. Id. at ¶¶ 124-26.
77. App. No. 25579 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 16, 2010).
78. Id. at ¶ 235 (noting the existence of a consensus), Id. at ¶ 241 (finding Irish restrictions
on abortion within its margin of appreciation).
79. See, e.g., Paeffgen GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05, and
21770/05, at 10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (rejecting admissibility of complaints regarding laws relating
to the improper use of domain names); Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 12868/87, ¶ 29 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Sept. 28, 1995) (rejecting challenge to Italy’s rent control law that deprived applicants of possession
of their apartments for long periods of time; court noted the “wide margin of appreciation” given the
state). See also Barrow v. United Kingdom, App. No. 42735/02, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 22, 2006)
(“The margin of appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic
policies should be a wide one.”).
80. Pressos Compania Navieca, S.A. v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶¶ 37-39, 43 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Nov. 20, 1995); Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶¶ 83, 90-91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6,
2005) (noting a lack of proportionality).
81. J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, ¶¶ 44, 46, 70-75 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2005). See also Hutten-Czapeska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶¶ 223-225
(Eur. Ct. H.R. May 17, 2006) (Polish rent control law violates Article 1) (Grand Chamber).
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however, reversed, finding that the interference in this case was not
disproportionate and that the system of land ownership was one in which
the government was entitled to an especially wide margin of
appreciation. 82 Other cases also evidenced a greater willingness to defer
to the member state’s law. 83 The application of the doctrine is,
therefore, somewhat unpredictable. Its operation may be contrasted with
United States equal protection doctrine where the level of deference or
scrutiny is more predictable and the outcomes, while not entirely
predictable, are at least somewhat predictable based on the level of
scrutiny. 84 However, it is worth noting that the ECHR follows a
somewhat analogous system when assessing the margin of appreciation
afforded under Article 14, the Convention’s antidiscrimination
provision. 85
Given the relative unpredictability of the outcome even when a
state has a wide margin of appreciation, it is difficult to assess whether
the ECHR would defer to the state’s legislative process (or lack thereof)
when deciding many of the issues discussed here.
V. CREATING CELEBRITY RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 8
Despite the fact that Article 8 appears to rest more on dignity
82. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd., App. No. 44302/02 at ¶ 83 (“Such arrangements fall within the
State’s margin of appreciation, unless they give rise to results which are so anomalous as to render
the legislation unacceptable.”). One dissent, on behalf of five judges, found the application in a
case of a registered owner to be disproportionate. Id. at ¶ 21 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges
Rozakis, Bratza, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Gyulumyan and Šikuta). A second dissent, on behalf of two
judges, found both a lack of proportionality and a failure of the adverse possession law to be in the
general interest. Id. (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides Joined By Judge Kovler).
83. E.g., Spadea, App. No. 12868/87 at ¶¶ 28, 40 (rent control); Benet Czech, spol. S.R.O. v.
The Czech Republic, App. No. 31555/05,¶¶ 35-40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 2010) (in seizure of
company bank accounts pursuant to a criminal investigation of a company officer; “the Courts will
respect the State authorities’ judgment as to what is in the general interest unless that judgment is
manifestly without reasonable foundation.”); Air Canada v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18465/91,
¶¶ 38, 48 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 5, 1995) (temporary seizure of airplane plus payment before any
hearing).
84. Race-based distinctions receive the highest scrutiny; economically based conditions
require only a “rational basis.” One exception may be discrimination based on sexual orientation,
where the Supreme Court uses a rational basis test, but has recently struck down governmental
actions. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (invalidating Colorado initiative that
removed specific protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (invalidating laws against homosexual sodomy). But cf. Citizens for
Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding Nebraska’s constitutional
initiative precluding recognition of same sex marriage, civil union, or other similar same sex
relationships).
85. See B v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36571/06, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2012) (wide
margin of appreciation in areas of social and economic policy).
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interests than commercial interests, one can postulate something akin to
a true right of publicity arising from this provision. As interpreted in
Von Hannover, Article 8 provides a suitable foundation, by imposing an
affirmative obligation on countries to protect privacy rights and by
limiting the legitimate sphere of press freedom regarding celebrities.
The ECHR may expand the right to privacy to protect a celebrity against
unwanted merchandising on the grounds that it dishonors the celebrity’s
name. In many countries in Europe the right to privacy is imbued with
both dignity interests and rights of commercial exploitation. 86 The
ECHR could hold that these personality rights inform the interpretation
of Article 8 and require a broader right to privacy, one that allows the
individual wide ranging control over various forms of commercialization
of his or her image. 87
The simplest extension would be to a use that falsely implies that
the celebrity endorses a particular product or service.88 Many celebrities
certainly would view such a false endorsement as an indignity. 89 Other
unauthorized uses, such as merchandising, might also be deemed
undignified and therefore invasive of a broad notion of privacy. 90 Von

86. In Von Hannover, Princess Caroline brought a claim in the German courts under a
provision of German copyright law, as well as privacy laws. Georgios Zagouras, Commercial
Exploitation of the Personality and License Requirements for Satiric Advertisements Under German
Law, 42 I.I.C. 74, 76-82 (2011) (discussing German cases on use of celebrities in advertising). See
generally Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on the Right to
One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 681-86 (2002); Elisabeth Logeais & Jean-Baptiste Schroeder,
The French Right of Image: an Ambiguous Concept Protecting the Human Persona, 18 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.REV. 511, 516-17 (1998); Stephen R. Barnett, “The Right to One’s Own Image”: Publicity
and Privacy Rights in the United States and Spain, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 555 (1999); Susanne
Bergmann, Publicity Rights in the United States and in Germany: a Comparative Analysis, 19 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 479, 479-80, 500-503 (1999).
87. In Burghartz v. Switzerland, App. No. 16213/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1994), the court
held that Article 8 gives a person an interest in his name, such that the state cannot arbitrarily deny
him the right to choose how his surname will be designated (married man wanted to use his wife’s
family name, but precede it with his own). “As a means of personal identification and of linking to
a family, a person’s name nonetheless concerns his or her private and family life.” Id. at ¶ 24.
Although this case does not establish that a pecuniary interest in one’s name is a privacy right, it is
not a large leap to say that a deceptive use of one’s name (e.g., a false endorsement) would
implicate a privacy right.
88. The U.K. already has some precedent in this area. See Irvine v. Talksport Ltd., [2002]
EWHC (Ch) [367].
89. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 976 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting jury award of
“$200,000 for injury to [Waits’] peace, happiness and feelings.”).
90. See Zagouras, Commercial Exploitation, supra note 86, at 82-85 (discussing
merchandising cases). In Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10,
2011), the ECHR refused to mandate that member countries require a newspaper to give advance
notice of any publications relating to the private life of a celebrity. Id. at ¶¶ 125-129. However, the
ECHR was highly critical of the publications in question (which had been successfully sued in
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Hannover’s requirement that the country give a private civil right of
action to protect the claim creates the basis for a private civil action.
The argument in favor of a strong publicity right, particularly one
grounded in Article 8, is not without some contrary precedent. For
example, in Vorsina v. Russia, 91 decided just months before Von
Hannover, the ECHR refused the application of the granddaughters of a
man whose portrait was used on bottles of beer. The court found that by
giving the portrait in question to a local museum, the family “had
agreed, in principle, that the portrait may be seen by others.”92 The
court also found that the brewery’s use did not dishonor the family. 93
This case involved a man who had been dead for several decades. That
fact may have been important in the court’s decision (though it was not
expressly mentioned in the court’s analysis). The court may have been
uncertain about how to handle such inherited claims, and how to allocate
“ownership” of the right after more than one generation. Moreover, the
court’s finding that the use was not undignified indicates that a less
dignified use (and the court did not define what that would be) might
have led to a different result. On the other hand, its statement that the
family had allowed the portrait to be seen publicly points to privacy, as
opposed to simple dignity, as a basis for Article 8 claims.
Moreover, as discussed above, there is at least the potential for
Article 10, the free expression provision, to enter the picture. In addition
to the Axel Springer case, in Karhuvaara v. Finland, 94 the ECHR
recognized that Article 10 has some force in right to privacy matters.
The court held that Finland violated Article 10 by criminally punishing a
newspaper for publishing a story about a criminal trial, and identifying
the defendant by name and by the fact that he was the husband of a
member of Parliament. 95 But the applicability of this judgment to

British courts) and was not completely unsympathetic to the plaintiff’s plea. Id. at ¶¶ 130-131.
Granting a right of publicity against a commercial use of a celebrity’s identity seems less drastic
than granting a prepublication right of notice, even if the latter is tempered by a “public interest”
exemption. See id. at ¶ 131. In Mosley, the ECHR was concerned about inhibiting free and open
debate. Id. at ¶ 132. However, the court’s view of the photographs in Von Hannover and MGN,
Ltd. suggests that it would not view commercial uses of celebrity identities as contributing to a
useful debate.
91. App. No. 66801/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 5, 2004).
92. Id. at *5. The Court did not consider the merits in a normal fashion; it ruled the
application inadmissible, meaning it appeared to be “manifestly ill-founded.”
93. Id. It was not clear that the court was denying a claim under Article 8; it began this
section by saying “assuming that Article 8” applies. The court did not consider Article 1 of the First
Protocol.
94. App. No. 53678/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004).
95. Id. at ¶¶ 54-55.
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private civil actions must be tempered by the court’s references to the
requirement of proportionality of the punishment 96 and the heavy fines
imposed by the government.97 Moreover, the case involved a political
figure, not a mere celebrity. 98 Thus, like Axel Springer, it can easily be
distinguished from Von Hannover.
Another attempt to expand the right to privacy was turned aside by
the ECHR when it refused to impose an obligation on the media to
notify the subject in advance of a news report. 99 Such advance notice
would permit the subject to seek a preliminary injunction against
publication; the ECHR recognized that this posed potential problems
with Article 10’s free press guarantee and that there was no consensus
among European countries on the need for such advance notice.100
On the other hand, these two cases did not involve endorsement or
merchandising uses of the celebrity’s identity. Thus, the balance more
easily tipped in the direction of Article 10 freedoms. In a commercial
context, that balance may shift.101
In the United States, the right to privacy has morphed into a right of
publicity, which is more like a property right and less like a dignity
interest—it is assignable and, in most states, inheritable. The right
described here under Article 8 is more like the U.S. right to privacy, in
that the attention is unwanted. It is not a question of who obtains the
commercial value of the celebrity’s identity, but a matter of precluding
the use entirely. In a later section of this paper, I postulate a more
property-like right of publicity under the Convention, but one that is
attached primarily to Article 1, First Protocol.
VI. THE EXTENSION OF IP RIGHTS THROUGH ARTICLE 10 OF THE
CONVENTION
It can be—and has been—argued that the application of human
rights standards is a positive development for intellectual property, in
that it “humanizes” intellectual property rights, and forces courts to
consider limitations based on the rights of those other than intellectual

96. Id. at ¶ 51.
97. Id. at ¶ 53.
98. Id. at ¶ 52. See Axel Springer A.G. v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, ¶ 111 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 7, 2012) (Grand Chamber) (prohibition on publishing an article and photo of an actor who was
arrested on cocaine related charges in a public place violated Article 10).
99. Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 132 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10, 2011).
100. Id. at ¶¶124, 129.
101. Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08, ¶¶39-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013); Hertel v.
Switzerland, Case No. 59/19977/843/104, ¶47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 25, 1998).
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property rights holders. 102 However, in view of the ECHR’s approach to
free press, the degree to which the application of the Convention would
humanize European intellectual property law is likely to vary widely,
depending on the country in question.
But Article 10 could be used as more than a limitation. In theory, it
might be the basis for extending IP rights as well. As a reminder, the
pertinent language of Article 10 is as follows (with some emphasis
supplied):
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
103
regardless of frontiers.

Building on the idea that the Convention creates affirmative as well
as negative obligations, Article 10 could support an expansion of
copyright. 104 If, as is sometimes postulated in the U.S., copyright is an
engine of free expression, one could argue for a robust copyright regime
as a means of allowing one to “impart information and ideas.” 105 No
doubt this right would have to reflect a balance of the rights of others to
free expression, and perhaps even some notion of proportionality, which
is a common feature of ECHR jurisprudence. 106
VII. EXTENDING IP RIGHTS THROUGH ARTICLE 1—FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES
Having laid an appropriate base for the application of the
Convention to private disputes, we can now return to Article 1, First
Protocol, as a more formidable foundation for the creation and/or
extension of IP rights. Through a series of cases, the ECHR has
established a methodology for analyzing problems under Article 1. The
first task is to lay out that methodology. Once the framework has been
102. See generally Christophe Gieger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The
Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, 37 I.I.C. 371
(2006); A. Kampelman Sanders, Unfair Competition Law and the European Court of Human
Rights: The Case of Hertel v. Switzerland and Beyond, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 305 (1999).
103. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 10 (emphasis added).
104. See Appleby v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44306/98, ¶¶ 39-40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6,
2003) (indicating the possibility of affirmative rights under Article 10). See also infra Section
VIII.D., discussing the creation and expansion of copyright through Article 1.
105. Cf. Lea Shaver and Caterina Spanga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On
Copyright and Human Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637 (2010) (discussing use of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a basis for copyright-like protection).
106. The concept of proportionality is discussed in more detail infra in Section VII. A.
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established, we shall discuss a variety of possible IP rights that could
flow from Article 1.
A.

The General Principles of the ECHR’s Article 1 Methodology

As the ECHR has noted on more than one occasion,107 Article 1 has
two paragraphs that express three separate, but related principles. The
first sentence of the first paragraph states a general principle, that one
has a right to enjoy one’s possessions without interference.108 The
second principle is stated in the second sentence, that one may not be
deprived of one’s possessions, except under specified conditions.109 The
third principle is contained in the second paragraph: the state can control
the use of one’s property, provided it complies with the conditions of the
paragraph, namely, that the control be consistent with the public
interest. 110 The second and third principles are regarded as specific
instances of the first principle.111 Consequently, the first principle stands
by itself; a violation of Article 1 can occur even if there is no total
deprivation, 112 and, apparently, even in the absence of an attempt by the
state to control the use of the property. 113 On the other hand, not all
“interferences” with property under the first principle will constitute
violations of Article 1. That principle also requires the state to strike a
balance between protecting the individual and protecting “the general
interest of the community.” 114
107. See, e.g., Perdigão v. Portugal, App. No. 24768/06, ¶ 57 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2010)
(Grand Chamber); Benet Czech, spol. S.R.O. v. The Czech Republic, App. No. 31555/05, ¶ 30 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Oct. 21, 2010); Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005)
(Grand Chamber); Sporrong v. Sweden, App. No. 7151/75; 7152/75, ¶ 61 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23,
1982). See Hermann v. Germany, App. No. 9300/07, ¶ 74 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 26, 2012) (Grand
Chamber) (the second paragraph of Article 1 is to be interpreted “in the light of the principle laid
down in the first sentence of the Article.”).
108. Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, art. 1.
109. Id.
110. Id. This requirement appears to preclude controls that are intended to favor one person or
a small group of people. Support for this argument also comes from a principle added by the court,
that is, one of balance between the rights of the individual and the rights of the society. See, e.g.,
Perdigão v. Portugal, App. No. 24768/06, ¶78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2010) (Grand Chamber).
111. See, e.g., Maurice, App. No. 11810/03 at ¶ 78.
112. See Sporrong, App. No. 7151/75; 7152/75 at ¶¶ 67-74.
113. Id. at ¶ 65 (finding the second paragraph inapplicable). This would support the idea that
affirmative state action is not a prerequisite to the application of this Article.
114. Id. at ¶ 69. In Sporrong, the city of Stockholm had been issued permits to take
applicants’ land, permits that were extended for many years but never executed. Id. at ¶¶ 9-30.
This was found to violate the first principle because the delays reduced the land’s value
(constituting an interference with its enjoyment) and the inflexibility of the process provided no
means to ameliorate the injury as the process dragged on. Id. at ¶¶ 70-74. This was a close
decision; the vote on this issue was 10-9. Eight dissenters felt that the second paragraph of Article 1
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Furthermore, the state’s ability to control the use of property under
the second paragraph of Article 1, even if the regulation is in the general
interest, is limited by a principle of proportionality. The ECHR has
stated that there must be “a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be reali[z]ed,”115
which amounts to striking a balance between the interest of the state and
that of the individual.116 That is, the state may not place an undue burden
on an individual, even to further a goal that is in the general interest.117
Compensation by the state for the interference with the individual’s
property interest is a factor in that proportionality. 118 When reviewing
whether the state’s action is in the general interest, the ECHR normally
grants the state “a wide margin of appreciation.”119 However, the
principle of proportionality still limits the state’s authority to control
property, and, by extension, its ability to permit others to interfere with
the owner’s enjoyment of the property. 120
The cases enunciating these principles involved direct state action
against an individual’s property interest. Other cases indicate that an
affirmative right that requires the state to afford protection against
private interference with property also exists under Article 1.121 A
was applicable, i.e. the permits constituted control of the use of the property by the state. But they
believed that the control was within the bounds of the “general interest” and therefore not in
violation of Article 1. Id. (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Zekia, Cremona, Thór
Vilkyálmsson, Lagergren, Sir Vincent Evans, MacDonald, Bernhardt and Gersing with regard to
Article 1 (of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)). Id. at 28. The ninth dissenter indicated that the majority was
recognizing too absolute a right in property and was insufficiently crediting the public interest. Id.
at 40 (Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Walsh).
115. Agosi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9118/80, ¶ 52. (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 1986). Cf.
Iatridis v. Greece, App. No. 31107/96, ¶ 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 25, 1999) (because the interference
violated Greek law, no need to determine whether “a fair balance has been struck between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the
individual’s fundamental rights.”); Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v.
Ireland, App. No. 45036/98, ¶ 149 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 30, 2005) (Grand Chamber).
116. Agosi, App. No. 9118/80 at ¶ 54.
117. Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 86 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005).
118. Id. at ¶ 87.
119. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the margin of appreciation.
120. The principle of proportionality is not limited to Article 1. The ECHR has invoked the
principle in relation to several other Articles, including Articles 8 and 10. See generally Alastair
Mobray, A Study of the Principle of Fair Balance in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 289 (2010). The notion of “fair balance” also is not unique to
the Convention. See Aharon Barak, Proportionality and Principled Balancing, 4 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 1 (2010).
121. Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010) (“The
boundaries between the state’s positive and negative obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
do not lend themselves to precise definition.”). See supra Part III.B. See also J. A. Pye (Oxford)
Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 30, 2007) (Grand Chamber)
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country’s property law (or tort law as it relates to harm to property)
reflects, albeit perhaps indirectly, the country’s level of control over the
use of property. A prohibition on theft, for example, reflects the
country’s goal that certain types of interference with property ownership
by private parties will not be countenanced. A tort action for conversion
reflects a similar goal. A country’s tolerance for unauthorized uses of
other forms of property by individuals also reflects the country’s
decisions concerning legitimate uses of property. 122 These decisions
could be weighed using the same principle of proportionality as in cases
of direct governmental interference with property.
The
affirmative/negative distinction need not change the basic framework
used by the ECHR in property rights cases. Thus, the questions in each
example posited below will include whether there is a possession at all,
what conduct would constitute an interference with the possession, and
whether the state may allow that interference in accordance with the
general interest, in the absence of any compensation for the interference.
This last question must include consideration of the proportionality
between the general interest and the burden placed on the individual.
B.

“Possessions,” “Interference,” and Private Rights

The application of Article 1 begins with a simple question—does
the claimant have a “possession”? The ECHR has stated that
[T]he concept of “possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has an
autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of
physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can
also be regarded as “property rights”, and thus as “possessions” for the
123
purposes of this provision.

Intangible property, including intellectual property, qualifies as a
possession. 124 Even interests that do not rise to the level of true
intangible property can be possessions. 125
(allowing a party to invoke adverse possession law against registered owner of property raises an
issue under Article 1 notwithstanding lack of direct state action).
122. See J. A. Pye, App. No. 44302/02.
123. Iatridis v. Greece, App. No. 31107/96, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999). Accord Paeffgen
GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, at 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007).
124. Balan v. Moldova, App. No. 19247/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 29, 2008).
125. Anheuser-Busch Corp. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶¶ 76-78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,
2007) (Grand Chamber) (application to register trademark deemed a possession within Article 1);
Paeffgen GMBH v. Germany, App. No. 25379/04, at 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (right to use domain
name as a possession); B. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36571/06, ¶¶ 38-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14,
2012) (where government reduced future benefits to recoup past overpayment, right to future
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It is not sufficient to postulate property rights, or “possessions.”
The Convention protects against an “interference” with the enjoyment of
one’s possessions, and one must ask how one can fit a case against a
country (a prerequisite to a suit in the ECHR) within the usual private
framework of intellectual property rights. As discussed above, this
obstacle may be overcome by Von Hannover’s insistence that a country
take affirmative steps to protect the right in question, even providing a
private cause of action as necessary. Although Article 1 and Article 8
protect different interests, it is logical for the ECHR to extend the
affirmative obligation of the state to the rights granted under Article 1.
A close examination of these Articles reveals several similarities in
structure. Both Articles begin with a general statement of rights that do
not mention interference by the state. Those rights are of a nature that
are often protected by tort law—invasion of privacy or conversion of
property. The Articles each follow with a subsection permitting a
certain level of state interference with the general right in order to
further important state interests.
Although it does not direct the member state to create a private
right of action, the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom 126
illustrates how a private dispute can implicate Article 1. In Pye, the
applicant company was the registered owner of a piece of land in Great
Britain, which it leased for a specified period to its neighbors 127 for
grazing. At the end of the lease period, the company refused to extend
the grazing rights period, but the neighbors continued to use the land. 128
After using the land without authorization for twelve years the neighbors
applied to register a claim to the land under the British statutes
governing adverse possession. 129 This was granted, and it divested Pye
of its claim to the land. 130 The British courts (with some apparent
reluctance) 131 upheld the neighbors’ claim under the relevant British
benefits were a possession, though overpayment made because of applicant’s misrepresentation is
not a possession); see Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, ¶¶ 126-127 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30,
2004) (applicant built house on land belonging to the government without permission; land was not
a possession even if applicant could have obtained it, but dwelling was a possession).
126. App. No. 44302/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2005).
127. Id. at ¶ 9. The neighbors were an individual family.
128. Id. at ¶ 11. For a time, the parties exchanged correspondence concerning the neighbors’
desire to continue using the land. However, this contact ceased after a few years. Id.
129. Id. at ¶ 12.
130. Id. at ¶ 3.
131. The reluctance stemmed from the fact that Pye’s ownership was registered and thus
public record. The courts believed that the primary interest served by adverse possession—certainty
of title—was only marginally advanced by allowing adverse possession against a registered owner.
Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.
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statutes. However, Pye appealed to the ECHR, which initially ruled in
its favor under Article 1. The Chamber specifically rejected the British
government’s argument that, because this was a private dispute not
involving governmental action, Article 1 was not applicable.132 It then
ruled that a violation of Article 1 had occurred.133 The case was
transferred to the Grand Chamber, which, by a vote of 10-7, reversed the
finding of a violation of Article 1.134 However, the Grand Chamber
accepted that Article 1 applies to cases between private individuals, at
least where the government is responsible for the application of its law
to the case. 135 Subsequently, the ECHR indicated that Article 1 does, in
Extending affirmative
fact, contain affirmative obligations. 136
obligations to property rights makes Article 1, First Protocol, the
foundation of many possible IP rights. The combination of treating
various intangibles of value as possessions, and the obligation of
member countries to provide a private right of action to prevent
interference with a possession, is a potentially powerful one.
C.

The Potential of Article 1 Further Revealed: Anheuser-Busch v.
Portugal

Perhaps ironically, the potential power of Article 1 for IP rights was
revealed in a decision that rejected an attempt to invoke Article 1 in
support of an IP right. The case was part of a long-running dispute
between brewer Anhueser-Busch and a Czech company over the rights
to the name Budweiser. The Czech company claimed to have a
geographic indication (“GI”) in the name (as translated from Czech to
German).
Anheuser-Busch filed an application for trademark
registration in Portugal, which the Czech company opposed. Although
Anheuser-Busch eventually received a registration, it was later cancelled
by the Portuguese courts on the grounds that a treaty between Portugal
and Czechoslovakia (as it was then called) required Portugal to
132. Id. at ¶¶ 50-52, 56.
133. It found that the application of the adverse possession statute to a registered owner
imposed a disproportionate burden relative to the governmental interest involved. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76.
See also Kanala v. Slovakia, App. No. 57239/00, ¶¶ 64-65 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007) (allowing
applicant’s property interest to be sold at foreclosure for far less than appraised value imposed
disproportionate burden).
134. J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, ¶ 85 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug.
30, 2007) (Grand Chamber).
135. Id. at ¶ 57.
136. Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010) (“The
boundaries between the state’s positive and negative obligations under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
do not lend themselves to precise definition.”) (emphasis added).
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recognize the Czech company’s GI. 137 Anheuser-Busch applied for
relief to the ECHR, claiming a violation of Article 1. In an initial
chamber judgment, the ECHR rejected the application, asserting that an
application to register that did not ripen into a final, non-appealable
registration could not be considered a “possession.” 138 Anheuser-Busch
then appealed to the Grand Chamber of the court. The Grand Chamber
also held that there was no violation of Article 1, but on somewhat
different grounds. Contrary to the decision of the Chamber, the Grand
Chamber decided that an application for a trademark registration is a
“possession” within the meaning of Article 1. 139 However, the judges
then decided that there had not been an “interference” with AnheuserBusch’s right to peaceful enjoyment of its possession. 140 The court
viewed Anheuser-Busch’s complaint as an attack on the correctness, as a
matter of domestic law, of the Portuguese Supreme Court’s decision
concerning the relative priority of rights between Anheuser-Busch and
its Czech adversary. 141 Thus, the court ruled that it could only review
the decision to the extent of determining that the Portuguese court’s
decision was not arbitrary “or otherwise manifestly unreasonable.” 142
Pointing out that Anheuser-Busch had had ample opportunity to present
its claim to the Portuguese courts, and noting that the questions of law
involved—the effect of any preexisting rights of the Czech company and
the effect of the 1986 bilateral agreement relating to the GI—were not
clear on the face of the laws themselves, the ECHR stated that it was for
the Portuguese courts to decide these issues and that the ECHR would
not disturb the decision. 143 Two judges dissented from this decision,
arguing that, once it was decided that an application was a possession,
the retroactive application of the 1986 agreement would constitute an

137. This is a somewhat simplified recitation of the events, which were rather complicated.
138. Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 11, 2005)
(the “Chamber opinion”).
139. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007)
(Grand Chamber) (the “Grand Chamber opinion”). Two judges concurred in the result, but
disagreed with the Grand Chamber’s rationale. They argued that, although intellectual property
(including a trademark registration) is generally within the protection of Article 1, an application is
not. Id. (Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Steiner and Hajiyev). Two other judges dissented. Id.
(Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch and Cabral Barreto).
140. Id. at ¶ 87.
141. Id. at ¶ 83.
142. Id.
143. Id. at ¶¶ 84-86. The Portuguese government made an analogous argument to the
Chamber below, to the effect that action by the ECHR would amount to an appeal on an issue of
domestic law.
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interference. 144
From the standpoint of intellectual property rights, the ruling that a
trademark application, which is even more ephemeral than a registration,
constitutes a “possession” is very important. The Grand Chamber noted
that “a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining an ‘asset’ may also enjoy
the protection of Article 1.” 145 It further noted several cases in which IP
rights were regarded as possessions, and held that IP rights “as such” are
protected by Article 1.146 With regard to the case of Anheuser-Busch,
the Grand Chamber noted in particular the pecuniary value of a
trademark registration application.147 As discussed below, the near
equation of pecuniary value with a possession is potentially very
expansive in the area of intellectual property. 148
VIII. USING ARTICLE 1 TO CREATE OR EXPAND IP RIGHTS: EXAMPLES
A.

Possible Trademark and Related Rights Developments from Human
Rights

A good starting point for the discussion of expanding IP rights is an
IP right already recognized to implicate Article 1, namely trademark
law. Anheuser-Busch made clear that trademarks, and even applications
to register trademarks, are “possessions” under Article 1 of the First
Protocol. 149 Anheuser-Busch involved an outright revocation of the

144. Id. at ¶ 5 (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch and Cabral Barreto).
145. Id. at ¶ 65 (Grand Chamber opinion).
146. Id. at ¶¶ 67-72.
147. Id. at ¶ 76 (“Such applications may give rise to a variety of legal transactions, such as a
sale or license agreement for consideration, and possess—or are capable of possessing—a
substantial financial value.”). The Chamber had also noted the financial value of the application,
but did not deem that sufficient to make it a possession. Id. at ¶¶ 47-48 (Chamber opinion).
148. The Grand Chamber’s disposition of the remainder of the case made an analysis of
whether there was an actionable “interference” unnecessary.
149. That trademark rights are considered important rights under the Convention also is
illustrated by the decision of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Nijs v.
Netherlands, App. No. 15497/89 (Eur. Comm’n. Hum. Rts. 1992). The applicants, a pharmacist, a
doctor, and a manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals, claimed that a limitation on the manner in
which doctors could prescribe drugs violated their rights under Articles 8 and 10, and Article 1 of
the First Protocol. Id. The doctor wanted to prescribe in the form “‘BRAND NAME’ or equivalent
other product according to agreed list.” Id. However, this was found by the local courts to violate
the trademark rights of the brand name manufacturer under Benelux law. Id. The Commission
rejected the Article 10 claim, stating that, although the regulation was an interference with free
expression, it was within the government’s right of control as “necessary in a democratic society,”
in order to protect another’s trademark rights. Id. The Commission noted that the prescription
could be written just in the generic name of the drug. Id. The claims under Article 8 and Article 1
were rejected because of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Id.
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trademark registration, but found no violation of Article 1. That result,
however, had more to do with the procedural posture of the case than
any substantive decision that revoking a registration is not an actionable
interference with property rights.150 Although the second sentence of
Article 1 refers to people being “deprived” of possessions—implying a
complete taking—the case law clearly shows that less than complete
takings will constitute violations if they disproportionately burden the
individual.
With this in mind, consider the example of trademark dilution.
Trademark dilution is a form of infringement that does not require a
showing of likelihood of confusion. Thus, it gives a trademark owner
rights in a trademark that often resemble copyright more than traditional
trademark rights, which are grounded more in issues of consumer
deception. Dilution protects the distinctiveness, or uniqueness, of a
trademark. Thus, an unauthorized use of a mark, even on a noncompeting good, makes the mark less unique as a source identifier. The
owner of a registered mark could argue that under Article 1, another’s
use of its mark that dilutes the distinctiveness of the owner’s registered
mark constitutes an interference with the enjoyment or use of its
property by lessening the trademark’s marketing power. If a mark is
diluted, the trademark owner’s property interest (i.e., the “possession”)
is diminished in value, perhaps even destroyed. The possibility of
complete destruction of the trademark’s value could be most acute if the
second use was one that tended to genericize the mark—for example,
using “Kleenex” as a generic word for tissue. 151
Dilution raises multiple issues under Article 1. The first problem
may be defining at what point a potentially diluting use becomes an
150. As noted, earlier, the ECHR seemed to view the case as though Anheuser-Busch claimed
that Portugal unfairly applied its law retroactively to Anheuser-Busch. Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal,
App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 82 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007) (Grand Chamber). It is noteworthy that prior
ECHR cases did find violations of Article 1 where member countries’ laws were applied
retroactively to deprive people of claims against the government (or even against private actors).
See, e.g., Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01, ¶¶ 50-52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006)
(retroactive change in law relating to loan disclosures deprived applicants of their expected statutory
recovery relating to failure to disclose) (opinion available in French only); Maurice v. France, App.
No. 11810/03, ¶¶ 3, 94 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber) (retroactive rescission of tort
claim violates Article 1).
151. If this sort of use is deemed to be an interference with the enjoyment of property rights,
then in some cases there may have to be a balancing between the rights of the trademark owner
under Article 1, and the rights of free expression of the second user under Article 10. If the second
user publishes a dictionary or a novel that uses the mark in a generic fashion, it would at least
implicate Article 10 rights. Whether the Article 10 rights would outweigh the Article 1 rights is not
clear. In many cases, the contribution of the use to a debate of public interest, as that is defined by
the ECHR, may be very small.
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actual interference or deprivation. Clearly, a trademark owner would
want to stop diluting uses before they cause measurable harm to the
trademark. 152 If the country’s trademark scheme is viewed as a means of
controlling uses of property, then the argument is directed at the
appropriate level of control.153
The second problem is determining whether the interference
violates the principle of proportionality. The state may have valid
reasons to allow at least a certain amount of dilution to occur. A desire
to permit free expression would allow various potentially tarnishing
uses. Tarnishing uses are ones that damage the reputation of the mark,
such as those that connect the mark to sex or drugs. Certain descriptive
or nominative uses of marks may be essential, or at least useful, in every
day discourse. 154 These reasons probably would be given significant
deference, or margin of appreciation, 155 in the analysis. But that still
leaves the question of proportionality. That the state’s actions
potentially affect large numbers of people does not appear to preclude a
violation. 156 Because of the potential for significant diminishment of the
trademark’s marketing power, the ECHR may find that allowing more
than de minimis dilution imposes too great a burden on an individual
trademark owner. Moreover, the interests of those who may be diluting
a mark will most often be commercial interests. This may “dilute” the

152. Cf. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (U.S. dilution statute,
as then worded, held to require actual dilution); id. at 435-436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing
concern about the trademark owner’s ability to stop incipient dilution under actual dilution
standard).
153. The mark owner then could argue that the state’s willingness to allow unauthorized
diluting uses of the mark deprives mark owners of a possessory right.
154. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (West 2013) (excluding certain descriptive and
nominative uses from liability for dilution under U.S. law). Descriptive uses would be uses not as a
trademark, but as a means of describing the product—like “soft and dry” towels (assuming that
“Soft & Dry” is a trademark for someone’s goods). Nominative uses are uses that point to the
trademark owner’s goods or services—such as a news report about “NIKE” shoes being made in
third world countries—but they are not used by the second user as a trademark for his or her own
goods.
155. See supra Part IV for a discussion of the margin of appreciation. However, comparative
advertising, which is accepted in the United States as not being trademark infringement, is not as
accepted in Europe. See L’Oreal S.V. v. Bellure N.V., Case C-487/07, ¶¶ 41, 47 (ECJ 2009)
(knockoff perfumes that were not confusingly similar violated EU dilution law). Thus, the margin
of appreciation granted if a country allows such uses may not be as large.
156. Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01, ¶¶ 50-52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006) (case
would apply to all applicants for loans prior to legislation) (opinion available in French only);
Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber). Cf. HuttenCsapska v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber) (rent control
as violation notwithstanding widespread effect).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 3
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 3 - WELKOWITZ (DO NOT DELETE)

706

AKRON LAW REVIEW

7/17/2013 10:13 AM

[46:675

value of protecting those interests to the ECHR. 157
Finally, although the crux of the dispute is one between private
parties, as discussed earlier, constructing an argument in favor of an
affirmative right against a private party is not difficult. A state tort or
property regime that permits others to destroy one’s possessions 158 could
constitute a deprivation of the right to the enjoyment of one’s
possessions.
Presumably, Convention member states have an
affirmative obligation to protect possessions from interferences that are
not in the general interest, even if that means providing private civil
causes of action to do so. 159
In practical terms, requiring member states to protect trademarks
against dilution would not be a seismic event. As a result of the
European Union’s Trademark Harmonization Directive, almost all of its
twenty-seven members protect trademarks against dilution.160 Other
non-EU European countries protect trademarks against dilution as
well. 161 However, once such a right is recognized as a “possession”
under the Convention, it leads to further issues. For example, suppose
that the European Commission decided to narrow the scope of its nonconfusion based trademark protections so that only marks deemed
“famous among the general consuming public of the European Union”
were protected. 162 Such an amendment would deny protection to marks
157. To some degree, consumers may have an interest in allowing certain forms of dilution—it
may promote competition, or it may add some terms to the lexicon. Ty v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509,
513-14 (7th Cir. 2003).
158. An extreme example would be a legal regime that turned a blind eye to physical
appropriations of one group’s tangible possessions by a competing group. Cf. infra section VIII.C.,
discussing trade secret law.
159. See Lobanov v. Russia, App. No. 15578/03, ¶ 46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 2, 2010). It may be
noted that, in the absence of a protective regime, such interferences would be pursuant to law, or the
lack thereof, but they could violate the concept of proportionality that is part of the ECHR’s
property rights jurisprudence.
160. Many of these laws were enacted pursuant to the European Union’s Trademark
Harmonization Directive. See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 650-58 (2d. ed. 2012). The EU’s Community Trade Mark Regulation
also provides for such protection. Id. at 658-59.
161. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION, supra note 160, at 662.
162. At present, the Trademark Harmonization Directive protects marks “with a reputation”
from certain non-confusing uses. TRADEMARK HARMONIZATION DIRECTIVE, art. 4(4)(a) and 5(2);
COMMUNITY TRADE MARK REG. art. 8(5) and 9(1)(c). The European Court of Justice has not
equated this limitation with a requirement of “fame,” let alone fame measured by the general
consuming public of the EU. My hypothetical is based on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 (“TDRA”). Prior to this amendment, U.S. law protected “famous” trademarks from dilution.
However, “famous” was defined in a way that arguably allowed marks famous only in a specific
product market (what the ECJ might call the “relevant public”) to be eligible for protection. The
TDRA restricted dilution protection to marks whose fame extended to the “general consuming
public of the United States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (West 2013).
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previously eligible. If a trademark registration163 is a “possession” and a
country removes an important protection from that possession, would
that constitute an interference, subject to Article 1? Much would depend
on the margin of appreciation given to countries to regulate possessions
in the public interest. However, in other contexts, the ECHR has found
the retroactive removal of choices in action to be violations of Article
1. 164
B.

A Property-Based Right of Publicity?

The Von Hannover case demonstrated that celebrities could expect
protection by Convention member countries for their personal interests
(at least those interests covered by the Convention), by the allowance of
a private civil action against other private actors who would invade the
celebrity’s realm. Von Hannover was what a United States observer
would categorize as a right to privacy suit. United States law,
particularly state law, often provides additional protection to celebrities
through the category known as right of publicity. 165 Rather than
protecting celebrities from invasions of their private space, the right of
publicity allows celebrities to control many commercial uses of their
names, likenesses, or “personas.” Not all of these uses are invasive or
undignified.
Based on the Von Hannover and Anheuser-Busch
decisions, might the ECHR extend the right to privacy from Von
Hannover (under Article 8) to cover the type of commercial uses
associated with the American right of publicity (under Article 1)?
The ECHR could hold that the rights to privacy and control of
merchandising provided in various European countries rise to the level
of a “possession,” and are protected by Article 1. Clearly, the ability to
use a celebrity’s name or likeness in the promotion of products is a
valuable commodity. The celebrity can license uses of his or her image
to others, analogous to the licensing of the use of a trademark. 166 In
163. The Directive only applies to registered marks.
164. E.g. Lecarpentier v. France, App. No. 67847/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2006); Maurice v.
France, App. No. 11810/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005) (Grand Chamber).
165. In this regard, it is interesting that the California statute protecting rights of publicity
post-mortem describes the right as a property right. CAL. CIV. CODE §3344.1(b) (West 2013). The
statute protecting rights of publicity for living persons does not contain this provision. Id. at § 3344.
See also FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-36-1-1 - 32-36-1-20
(West 2013).
166. See Zagouras, Commercial Exploitation, supra note 86, at 82-85. Here it is worth noting
that in both Von Hannover cases, Princess Caroline’s suit in the German courts included a claim
under a provision of German law which is part of the Act on Artistic Creations—a relative of
copyright. Copyrights, like trademarks, would be considered possessions under Article 1.
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Anheuser-Busch, the court stressed the pecuniary value of a trademark
application when finding it to be a possession. Merchandising is
generally viewed as a valuable aspect of one’s personality. As long as
licensing of an image is permitted, one has a “legitimate expectation,” to
use the ECHR’s terms, in being able to reap that value. That being the
case, the state’s unwillingness to allow a celebrity to police the right
(which could either dilute its licensing value or destroy it altogether)
could constitute an “interference” with the celebrity’s enjoyment of that
possession. Moreover, the ECHR is somewhat unlikely to view
allowing such an interference as within the general interest under Article
1, nor is it likely to view the deprivation of control of the celebrity’s
image as proportional to the protected interest. In Von Hannover (no. 1),
the court gave little deference to the German courts’ assertion that
Princess Caroline, as a public figure, was newsworthy and therefore
invasions of her privacy were allowed.167 In the case of endorsements
and merchandising, the purely commercial aspects of the activity
probably would be deemed even less worthy of protection by the
ECHR. 168
If such a right of publicity is recognized, it is likely to be more
extensive than the analogous right recognized domestically. U.S. courts
are somewhat solicitous of free speech arguments when something other
than simple “merchandising” is at issue. 169 However, in Von Hannover,
the ECHR obviously believed that there was little free speech interest in
satisfying the public’s desire for information about a celebrity.
Consequently, the ECHR may find little free speech interest in profiting
from the use of another’s image, even where the use, for example,
constitutes an artistic interpretation of the celebrity’s image. 170

167. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, ¶ 72 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 24, 2004).
168. Ashby v. France, Case No. 36769/08, ¶¶39-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013); Hertel v.
Switzerland, Case No. 59/1997/843/1049, ¶47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Aug. 25, 1998).
169. E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, at 924-25, 931-36 (6th Cir. 2003)
(lithograph of Tiger Woods at the Masters tournament protected by First Amendment); Hoffman v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (magazine story with altered
picture of Dustin Hoffman as “Tootsie” subject to First Amendment protection); Winter v. DC
Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 480 (Cal. 2003) (comic book portraying Johnny and Edgar Winter as
grotesque characters protected by First Amendment). But cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup,
21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) (non-transformative lithograph of Three Stooges not protected by First
Amendment); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 100 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (comic book character named
after former hockey player violated player’s right of publicity and not protected by First
Amendment).
170. Cf. ETW Corp. 332 F.3d 915 (lithograph of Tiger Woods at the Masters protected by First
Amendment). This would be consistent with the more expansive notion of moral rights in copyright
recognized by European countries.
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Furthermore, the broad notion of “newsworthiness” applied in some U.S.
cases 171 probably would not be an effective defense in the ECHR. 172
C.

Article 1 and Trade Secret Law

Cementing dilution protection would not fundamentally change
existing IP rights. But the Convention may be used to create rights as
well as extend them. One possibly fertile ground for creating IP rights
from Article 1 is trade secrets. To fully appreciate how Article 1 might
protect trade secrets, consider whether a country with no trade secret
protection would be obliged to protect them. Without any domestic
trade secret protection, one might argue that the trade secret owner has
no “possessions” to be protected by Article 1. However, the AnheuserBusch opinion contains several statements that suggest that Article 1
would still apply. Although the ECHR did refer to the existence of
rights under Portuguese law relating to intellectual property (in this case,
specifically to trademark registration applications), it also stated that a
“possession” under Article 1 is to be considered independent of domestic
law. 173 That suggests that an Article 1 possession may not depend on
the preexistence of actual property rights under domestic law.
Moreover, the ECHR’s discussion of whether Anheuser-Busch’s
application was a possession emphasized that the application had
significant financial value—it could be sold or licensed, for example. 174
The same is true of a trade secret; it can be licensed or sold to another
business and may have considerable financial value. 175 This value
would not depend on the willingness of any country to protect the trade
secret from theft—its value stems from its secrecy, and, presumably, the
expected ease of keeping it a secret. Thus, one would expect that a trade
secret would meet the criteria of a “possession.”

171. See, e.g., Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing & Publ’g, 727 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 2000)
(photograph not completely unrelated to article although not of the person named in column); CBC
Distrib. & Mktg, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007) (fantasy baseball league can use public statistics and names of players).
172. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15 (H.L.) (granting relief under the
U.K. Human Rights Act to model for pictures taken of her outside a drug rehabilitation facility, and
citing ECHR precedent). The ECHR, noting the balancing and citation of ECHR precedent by the
U.K courts, rejected an application by MGN claiming that the judgment was a violation of Article
10. MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 39401/04, ¶¶ 149-156 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 18, 2011).
173. Anheuser-Busch v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11, 2007)
(Grand Chamber).
174. Id. at ¶ 76.
175. Indeed, under US law, the definition of a trade secret is something that has value because
of its secrecy. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4) (1985).
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The next step would be to determine whether the theft of a trade
secret is a “deprivation” or a “control” of property. In one important
sense, loss of a trade secret is a deprivation in that the loss of secrecy
deprives the owner of the key component of value. On the other hand,
the owner retains the know-how behind the trade secret and is still able
to use the process (or whatever the secret is). Moreover, the
misappropriator has an incentive not to reveal the secret any further in
order to maintain its value.176
For a state to justify its own interference with a possession, it would
have to show that the interference was in accordance with domestic law.
Presumably, in the case of a private interference, the state would have to
at a minimum show that the private person’s actions were in some sense
lawful. In the trade secret context, that should mean that if the secret
was taken by means that are independently unlawful—for example, by
burglarizing the company’s premises—then a failure of the state to allow
the owner to enjoin the use of the secret and/or recover for its use should
be a violation of Article 1.177 However, the acquisition may have been
by means that are not independently unlawful, say, by flying an airplane
over a plant while it is being built.178 Finally, under Article 1, one must
consider the issue of proportionality. Presumably, a state would argue
that weak or nonexistent trade secret protection serves the public interest
by allowing competition and thereby lowering the price of goods or
services. It could also argue that weak protection serves to deter
inappropriate uses of a trade secret (e.g., charging exorbitant prices) in
light of the potentially perpetual nature of a trade secret, unlike a patent
or copyright. On the other hand, the ECHR has appeared wary of
otherwise legitimate state policies that force an individual (as opposed to
society at large) to bear the brunt of the policy’s downside. Here, the
holder of the trade secret is being made to bear the weight of the state’s
176. This assumes that the secret was taken to exploit its economic value and not simply to
harm the owner by revealing it in the manner of Wikileaks. Moreover, if the secret is a customer
list, then its loss would likely destroy its value.
177. Note that even if the state allows some sort of tort action for the act of taking, if it does
not protect the owner from the consequences of the taking, i.e., the loss of secrecy and the ability of
another to compete, then the principle of fair balance may still be violated.
178. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir. 1970)
(taking pictures of unfinished plant by flying over it as trade secret violation). Article 39 of TRIPS
requires members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to protect trade secrets, so the
likelihood of a country not having any trade secret protection is small. But Article 39 appears not to
require protection from all trade secret misappropriation; only appropriations by means that in the
United States would be independently wrongful; breach of contract, inducement to breach a
contract, and breach of confidence are clearly within the required protection of Article 39. TRIPS
Art. 39 fn. 10.
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pro-competitive policies. This compares to other situations in which the
ECHR found a disproportionate burden and, thus, a violation of Article
1. 179 Clearly, the requirement of a trade secret regime would also
depend on imposing affirmative obligations under Article 1, a topic
discussed earlier.
Trade secret protection is bolstered by Article 8, the right to
privacy. The essence of a trade secret is its secrecy. One who reveals
the secret either in violation of an understanding that it would be kept
secret (somewhat like the British common-law claim for breach of
confidence) or who misappropriates it, would be said to be violating
privacy.
D.

A Mandate for Copyright?

All European countries have some form of copyright protection.
But what if we imagine a Europe without copyright protection? Would
the Convention require its existence? Begin with Article 1. Is there any
“possession” that an infringer could interfere with?180 Assume you have
created a “work” such as a manuscript for a book. Arguably, the work is
a possession by virtue of its potential value—one could, for instance, sell
it to a book publisher. Although the work itself (as opposed to a copy) is
an intangible, the ECHR seems comfortable affording intangibles
protection as possessions. But would the act of unauthorized copying
constitute an unwarranted interference? That may depend on when the
copying takes place. If the manuscript is taken and published before the
author has an opportunity to publish it, then that constitutes the strongest
situation for interference. A prepublication appropriation deprives the
author of any opportunity either to extract value by sale or license or to
control the context of the use.
However, that opportunity can be respected by a limited tort regime
that outlaws such prepublication appropriations, subject to limitations
based on free speech principles, 181 and possibly limits based on time—
the author’s life, for instance. To bolster the argument under Article 1,
179. See Pressos v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 1995); HuttenCzapeka v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶ 225 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber);
Maurice v. France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 93 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber).
180. Keep in mind that a possession cannot be based on the hope that the courts will create a
right. See Malhous v. Czech Republic, App. No. 3307/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 13, 2000) (Grand
Chamber); Kopecky v. Slovakia, App. No. 44912/98, ¶ 35(c) (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2004) (Grand
Chamber).
181. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 569 (1985)
(rejecting First Amendment defense to copyright infringement where prepublication dissemination
took the “core” of the work).
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we may invoke Article 8 of the Convention, the privacy provision, and
assert that disseminating an unpublished work violates the author’s right
to keep it private. But none of this requires us to create a full-blown
copyright in the work.
A variety of roadblocks exist to the mandating of a copyright
regime. Even assuming that the expression of an idea (i.e., a “work”) is
a possession of its creator, when imposing affirmative obligations under
the Convention, the ECHR normally weighs the impact on the individual
against the impact on the state and society, and looks to whether the
individual is being forced to bear a disproportionate burden.182
Although the lack of a copyright regime would reduce the value of the
author’s work, it need not be extinguished altogether. It may be that the
lead-time monopoly would be sufficient to extract value from the
work. 183 It would not be as much value as a copyright monopoly, but
there is no inherent right to make monopoly profits under Article 1,
unless the state’s legal regime grants such rights. Moreover, one might
add that Article 10 of the Convention, protecting free expression, gives
additional support for the dissemination of information without
copyright. Finally, the ECHR may give the state a considerable margin
of appreciation because the imposition of a copyright regime would
require the state to enact a potentially complex legislative scheme to
properly balance the rights of authors and society, and this is a task illsuited for a court.
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the ECHR has
shown a fair degree of indulgence of property rights when asked to
weigh them against free expression, at least where there were alternative
means of expression available.184 An infringer can express him or
herself without appropriating the author’s work. Combined with the
argument that free expression is actually enhanced by copyright,185 and
the fact that the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights contains explicit
support for intellectual property, 186 the ECHR might be persuaded to
182. See, e.g., Appleby v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44306/98, ¶ 40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6,
2003); Pressos v. Belgium, App. No. 17849/91, ¶ 43 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 30, 1995); Hutten-Czapeka
v. Poland, App. No. 35014/97, ¶ 225 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 19, 2006) (Grand Chamber); Maurice v.
France, App. No. 11810/03, ¶ 93 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 6, 2005) (Grand Chamber).
183. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 293 (1970). Justice (then Professor)
Breyer wrote at a time when ebooks and widespread Internet access were not issues. The ease with
which books, and other materials, can be copied, distributed, and read on an e-reader such as a
Kindle or an iPad may make his analysis outdated.
184. See Appleby, App. No. 44306/98 at ¶ 48.
185. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012).
186. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 2.
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require at least a limited copyright regime protecting the author’s
reproduction right. However, it would be surprising if the court went
beyond that, at least in countries without any pre-existing copyright
regime, to impose the kind of copyright scheme contemplated by TRIPS
or European copyright statutes. Clearly, performance rights, display
rights, and adaptation rights would be a rather large leap for the court,
even if imposing a mandate of protection against reproduction would
not. 187
This, of course, assumes no pre-existing copyright regime. Because
all countries joining the WTO must adhere to TRIPS, which requires at
least some level of copyright protection, European countries would have
some sort of copyright protection. 188 Below we shall discuss possible
extensions to an existing copyright regime that could be mandated under
the ECHR’s Article 1, Article 8, and Article 10 jurisprudence.
E.

Moral Rights

The Berne Convention on copyrights requires protection of what
are conventionally called “moral rights” of authors.189 Protection of
moral rights permits authors—even those who no longer own the
economic rights to their works—to prevent certain uses of those
works. 190 European countries already protect the moral rights of
authors. 191 However, the scope of these rights is not uniform. If the
187. One would expect that the wide margin of appreciation afforded countries in a
commercial context would allow countries to choose the details of the economic rights afforded
authors and copyright owners.
188. Russia, which already has a copyright regime, was the last major country outside of
TRIPS. The Russian Federation joined the World Trade Organization—thus subjecting itself to
TRIPS—in 2012. Seven other members of the Council of Europe—Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Monaco, San Marino, and Serbia—still are not members of the WTO. See
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). Of
those, all except San Marino are members of the Berne Convention. See www.wipo.int/treaties (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012). San Marino is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”) and the Paris Convention, and it has a copyright statute (one that also includes moral
rights). See www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=SM (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
189. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis. [hereinafter
Berne Convention]. United States copyright laws protect moral rights, but only to a limited degree.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (West 2013).
190. The principal moral rights are the right of attribution, right of integrity, right of first
publication, and right of withdrawal. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing
the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 569, 660 & n.4; Cyrill R. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral
Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 359 (2006). See generally ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE
SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (Stanford Law
Books 2010).
191. Virtually all Convention countries are members of the Berne Convention. That does not
guarantee implementation of a moral rights provision; Berne has no formal enforcement mechanism
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ECHR interprets the Convention to apply to moral rights, it might
impose some measure of uniformity. The three provisions of the
Convention we have been discussing could apply to moral rights.
Conceivably, Article 10 of the Convention could be used to limit
moral rights. However, this seems unlikely, especially if the moral
rights of authors are analogized to a kind of dignity interest similar to the
interest protected by Article 8. 192
On the other side of the coin, Article 1, First Protocol, could
provide the means to expand moral rights. There are, however, several
potential obstacles to using Article 1 as a source of moral rights. First,
Article 1 requires the existence of a “possession.” Given the fairly broad
view of possessions taken by the ECHR in Anheuser-Busch, one might
not expect this to be a serious obstacle. But, in fact, this may be a
serious issue. An author’s moral rights are independent of her
ownership of the copyright in the work. Thus, the economic rights to the
copyright may be owned by someone other than the author. Moral rights
give the author the right to require attribution, to prevent alteration of the
work, and to prevent uses that would bring dishonor to the author. 193
These are not inherently pecuniary rights. They appear not to be
intended to give the author extra money for the work by imposing an
obligation to pay for its use. Rather, they appear to exist to allow the
author to prevent certain uses of the copyrighted work. Thus, they
would not have a monetary value. Conceivably, if the moral rights are
waivable, the copyright owner (or a licensee) might pay an extra sum to
the author for a waiver. The availability of that extra value might be
sufficient to make moral rights into a “possession.” But not all countries
permit waivers, and those that do differ on the exact parameters of the

and neither the TRIPS Agreement nor the European Union require moral rights implementation.
Rigamonti, Deconstructing, supra note 190, at 357-58. See Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra
note 190, at 706-09 (discussing moral rights implementation in various countries); TRIPS
Agreement, art. 9(1) (specifically excluding Berne’s moral rights provision from TRIPS). However,
at least formally, European copyright statutes appear to include some form of moral rights, as
indicated by the statutes listed in the WIPO database WIPOLEX.
192. This does not mean that Article 8 would be a direct source of moral rights. Though not
inconceivable, it is unlikely that an alteration of an author’s work would rise to the level of an
invasion of the author’s privacy. But cf. Hughes, American Moral Rights, supra note 190, at 707
(noting that the United Kingdom used privacy-like protection to implement moral rights).
Nevertheless, when considering the proper scope of free expression, one would expect the ECHR to
consider the countervailing dignity interest of the author.
193. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 189, at art. 6bis (giving authors, inter alia, the
right to prevent actions “in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to [the author’s]
honor or reputation.”).
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rights and the ability to waive. 194 This is a difficult question, not easily
answered by the ECHR’s case law.
However, if the ECHR finds that moral rights are possessions, an
unauthorized alteration of the work could be considered an interference
with that right, and therefore a violation of the right to enjoy one’s
possessions. There are several areas in which a failure to enforce or
allow moral rights could lead to an Article 1 claim. The Berne
Convention gives rights against uses that harm an author’s reputation,
but an author might want to challenge other alterations of (or perhaps the
imminent destruction of) the work. Presumably, the government would
defend on the basis of the general interest in making various uses—
especially “transformative” or communicative uses—of an existing work
without interference by the author. This defense would be strengthened
if the copyright owner gave consent to, and was paid for, the use. In that
case, the moral rights of the author interfere with the economic rights of
the copyright owner. This invokes Article 1 in favor of the copyright
owner and Article 10 in favor of communication to the public. Given
the normal margin of appreciation, that should make the government’s
inaction consistent with the general interest. The remaining question
would be one of proportionality. If the author’s interest is purely
pecuniary, it is unlikely to trump the general interest. Whether an author
who simply feels personally insulted by the use despite its lack of effect
on reputation or honor would claim an undue imposition (in the manner
perhaps of Article 8) is a more difficult question to answer. If the ECHR
views the use as having little communicative value, then the author’s
prospect of winning is significant.195 On the other hand, if imposing a
right to preclude alterations, which may interfere with the normal right
to allow derivative works, significantly interferes with the economic
value of the work, then the author’s imposition may be deemed
disproportionate. 196
The ECHR could also include Article 8 in the analysis of moral

194. See WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VISUAL ARTWORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER
COPYRIGHTS 26-52 (Mar. 1, 1996) (discussing waiver policies of fourteen countries and the
European Union). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2013) (allowing waiver of rights under the Visual
Artists Rights Act).
195. The imminent destruction of a work raises different questions. If it is a publicly
displayed work, then the public loses out by its destruction. But there is a countervailing interest in
the owner of the embodiment of the work (a sculpture, painting, etc.), which might be protected
under Article 1, especially if destruction is economically necessary. But if the author is willing to
pay compensation, the balance tips in another direction.
196. This also raises the question whether a broad moral right to preclude any alteration overly
interferes with the copyright owner’s interest, which is protected under Article 1.

OF
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rights. 197 To the extent that moral rights represent the author’s
personality imbued in the work, a right of personality would be a
possible way to protect that interest.198 There would be a need to
balance any Article 8 right against an Article 10 right of free
expression—especially if an alteration of a work promotes a debate on a
matter of general interest.199 The proportionality inquiry would be more
complicated. The author of a work that has been made public may have
to accept a certain level of public use of the work. 200 However,
alterations that impugn the reputation of the author may be deemed
excessive in light of the point being made. If the author’s claim is that
any alteration is impermissible, then, as noted above, Article 10 and
Article 1 may enter the picture—Article 10 favors dissemination of
differing points of view and Article 1 protects the economic value of the
work, which in this case is owned by the copyright owner, not
necessarily the author.
Because moral rights are part of an international treaty, inferring
such rights from the Convention, like trademark dilution, may not
represent a significant inroad in the world of intellectual property.
However, given the variation in moral rights among different countries,
even those that adhere to the Berne Convention, it is possible that the
ECHR would decide to protect those rights to an extent not provided by
all countries (as in Von Hannover). Moreover, the ECHR could review
the legitimacy of certain limitations on moral rights. This independent
analysis could cause problems in connection with a waiver of moral
rights, an area where countries do have different rules. On the one hand,
the ECHR may find that upholding a waiver given under somewhat
coercive circumstances is a violation of the right. On the other hand, the
ECHR could rule that a failure to allow an author to recoup the
pecuniary value of waiving the right is also a violation. Finally, the
application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation could allow some
variation in the precise scope of the rights.

197. See Rigamonti, Deconstructing, supra note 190, at 393-94 (discussing use of rights of
personality in some countries to protect moral rights).
198. Burghartz v. Switzerland, App. No. 16213/90, ¶ 24 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 1994) (noting
the importance of one’s name to personal autonomy).
199. Article 10 would seem to favor a right of attribution insofar as it disseminates accurate
information about the work to the public.
200. Cf. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶120 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 7,
2012) (Grand Chamber) (noting that public status is not irrelevant to analysis under Article 8).
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Rights to Traditional Knowledge

One other area in which the Convention could be used to expand
intellectual property rights is traditional knowledge. 201 As chronicled by
other scholars, various forms of traditional knowledge and folklore,
including songs, dances, and knowledge of the medicinal properties of
various plants, have value in the modern world.202 This knowledge often
is not considered to be the individual property of any one person, but,
rather, is “owned” by the group for the benefit of the group. In some
instances, outsiders have sought to exploit this knowledge and tradition
and to acquire IP rights in that knowledge and tradition. Article 1, First
Protocol provides a possible means of preventing such acquisitions by
granting rights to the group (or, if identifiable, the individuals) from
which the knowledge and tradition originates. Such knowledge and
tradition, having value, should be considered a possession. However,
the issue of who owns the possession is particularly significant. Unlike
Articles 8 and 10, Article 1 specifically gives rights to “[e]very natural
or legal person.” 203 But depending on the structure of the group
claiming rights in the traditional knowledge, it may not be deemed a
“legal person.” And the individuals within the group may not have a
sufficient right of ownership to be able to bring suit individually under
Article 1. 204
Article 34 of the Convention may be of some assistance in dealing
with this problem. Article 34 allows individual suits in the ECHR
against member countries. But Article 34 does not limit standing to
“individuals,” or “legal persons,” be they natural persons or

201. A number of articles have discussed the possibility of using various human rights
conventions to protect traditional knowledge. For a recent example, see Rebecca Gross, The “I” in
Indigenous: Enforcing Individual Rights Guarantees in an Indigenous Group Rights Context, 27
N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 65 (2010).
202. See, e.g., Gary K. Schlais, The Patenting of Sacred Biological Resources, the Taro Patent
Controversy in Hawai’i: A Soft Law Proposal, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 581 (2007); Christine Haight
Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (1997). The rather simple argument I am presenting here deliberately sidesteps many
complications and nuances of the debate about protecting traditional knowledge. It is not my
purpose in this paper to take sides in this debate. The arguments here are based only on what could
occur, and are not normative judgments about such results.
203. Convention, supra note 9, at protocol 1, article 1.
204. See, e.g., Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, ¶ 64-65, 71 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24,
1995) (shareholders not considered proper applicants on behalf of corporation—one dissenter
thought shareholders should be proper applicants); Holy Synod Of The Bulgarian Orthodox Church
(Metropolitan Inokentiy) v. Bulgaria, App. No. 412/03, ¶ 168 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 22, 2009) (ousted
former members of church leadership, who did not claim ownership interests in the property of the
church, not proper applicants for Article 1 action).
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corporations. Instead, it permits suit by any “non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be a victim of a
violation” of the Convention. 205 Thus, in order to invoke the protection
of the Convention, a group need not have any particular structure. While
this does not necessarily override the limits of Article 1, it does suggest a
possible solution. Article 13 of the Convention requires countries to
provide “an effective remedy” for violations of Convention rights.206 If
a country refuses to grant legal status to a group, effectively making it
impossible for anyone to challenge the country’s decision to allow others
to use, or even acquire rights in, the traditional knowledge, it may be
failing to provide an effective remedy for a Convention violation. Of
course, such a remedy could take many forms, but if the barriers to a
challenge are severe, Article 13 could provide the means to allow the
group some sort of effective enforcement. That would require either the
country or the group to come up with some appropriate representative or
representatives to bring the action.207 This analysis would permit a
group claiming rights to traditional knowledge to have standing in the
ECHR to sue for interference with their possessory interests in the
traditional knowledge. 208 The ECHR may also look to the recent WIPO
205. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 34.
206. Id. at art. 13. Article 1 of the Convention—the actual one, not the one in the First
Protocol—commits member states to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and
freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.” Id. at art. 1. Although Article 1, First Protocol,
is not in Section 1, Article 5, First Protocol effectively merges the provisions of the First Protocol
with the existing Convention.
207. Cf. 25 U.S.C. § 305e (West 2013) (the Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which references other
statutes defining “Indian” and “Indian tribe”).
208. But whether such a group could claim to be a “victim” under Article 34 could raise
problems analogous to the natural or legal person problem of Article 1. On the other hand, case law
under Article 13 only requires that there be an “arguable” violation of the Convention in order to
trigger the effective remedy requirement. See G.R. v. Netherlands, App. No. 22251/07, ¶ 44 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2012). Although that seems grounded in the substance of the Convention—i.e.,
one must have an arguable claim that the substance of a Convention right to which you would be
entitled has been violated—it would seem reasonable to include procedure within the ambit of
Article 13 as well. The ECHR has said that the concept of a “possession” in Article 1 has an
“autonomous” meaning that is not dependent on the law of a particular country. It is logical to
extend that reasoning to the meaning of “legal person” as well. Exactly who “owns,” or at least has
the right to represent the interest of groups claiming interests in traditional knowledge is the subject
of some debate. I will assume that there is some principled way to identify the “group” and some
equally principled way to identify a proper representative for the group. I am also assuming that,
even if the group does not recognize “ownership” in the same manner contemplated by Article 1,
the ECHR would recognize that having a legitimate interest in excluding others from using the
knowledge is the equivalent of “possessing” it, making the knowledge a possession within the
meaning of Article 1. In addition to Article 13, Article 14, which prohibits discrimination, might be
applicable if the country effectively favors outsiders over indigenous groups that have traditional
knowledge. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 14.
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draft of a protective scheme for traditional knowledge 209 as evidence of
an emerging consensus that such knowledge should be protected in some
manner and that the Convention should not erect artificial barriers to the
realization of such protection.
A state that gave IP rights in this knowledge to the outsiders could
be required to recognize the rights of the indigenous owners under
Article 1, or at least give compensation for the interference. This, of
course, assumes that the exploitation of such knowledge by others
constitutes an interference, or that the state could not allow such
exploitation as being in the general interest (as permitted by Article
1). 210
Interestingly, the Article 1 approach could allow the problem of
traditional knowledge to be analyzed outside of the strict confines of
traditional intellectual property law.211 This could permit a more
flexible approach to the problem. Moreover, certain limits of traditional
IP rights, such as durational limits, ownership issues (subject to the
“natural or legal person” issue discussed above), and fixation issues
(whether the knowledge is “fixed” in some tangible way), are not
necessarily obstacles under Article 1. In particular, the ECHR’s
proportionality requirement under Article 1 could permit a certain
degree of flexibility in balancing the competing claims of various groups
to this knowledge under certain circumstances. For example, the state’s
interest with respect to the use of certain biologically significant plants
that confer a public benefit by being made available might outweigh the
interest of an individual or even a group in keeping the knowledge
within the group. However, the public interest in making dances, songs,
or artwork available—and assigning ownership to other than the
originating group—may be deemed disproportionately small compared
to the group or individual interest at stake. And, if one factors in
possible Article 8 rights to privacy that could be asserted by the group to
209. Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/index.html (last visited May 2, 2013) [hereinafter Traditional
Knowledge]. Article 2 of this document lists the intended beneficiaries of protection. Article 3,
among other things, requires countries to provide “adequate and effective legal measures” to protect
the interests of the beneficiaries.
210. For example, if the traditional knowledge had medicinal value and the group refused to
license it, this might trigger the general interest provision. See Shuba Ghosh, Reflections on the
Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L AND COMP. L. 497, 509-510 (2003)
(comparing this problem to the problem of moral rights). However, it is also possible that, under the
proportionality concept, the ECHR would require the state to give some compensation to the group.
211. Farley, Protecting Folklore, supra note 202, at 40-50 (discussing alternatives to
traditional copyright protection).
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its knowledge, 212 the balancing would not necessarily favor the usual IP
rights regime. 213
IX. SOME CAUTIONARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF THE
CONVENTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
A.

Who Are the Primary Beneficiaries of Expanded Rights Under the
Convention? Follow the Money

To the extent that Article 1 is used to expand IP rights, those cases
will revolve around assets with a pecuniary value. Although applicants
in the ECHR generally request monetary damages, the value of creating
or extending IP rights often extends beyond the particular incident
giving rise to the claim. The value of IP rights makes it likely that IP
owners will go to great lengths to assert their rights. Though not the
exclusive province of corporations, corporate ownership of IP rights
appears to predominate over individual ownership. Thus, IP rights may
favor corporate rights holders over other individuals. 214 Though this is
not inherently bad, a corporate actor may have more resources to take
cases to the ECHR than an individual, and the availability of legal
advice to promote such action. The ECHR increasingly may find itself
asked to decide commercial issues in the form of human rights cases,
potentially crowding its calendar at the expense of other cases. The
ECHR is already behind in its adjudication of claims. 215 Adding IP
rights claims in large numbers would increase the delay for all claims.
Of course, some of the expansion discussed above might not
212. The WIPO draft on traditional knowledge protection acknowledges the privacy aspect of
traditional knowledge. Traditional Knowledge, supra note 209, art. 1, § 1.2 (Option 1).
213. Compare Von Hannover v. Germany (no.1), App. No. 59320/00, ¶ 74-80 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
June 24, 2004) (finding Germany’s balance of free expression and privacy to be inconsistent with
Article 8) with Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), App. No. 40660/08, ¶¶ 124-126 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 7, 2012) (finding Germany’s balance consistent with Article 8).
214. Of course, corporations own other forms of property as well. But in cases involving that
type of property—real property being a prime example—protecting corporate rights can be a useful
proxy for protecting individual owners since a large number of individuals own the same type of
property.
215. According to the Court’s statistics, it disposed of nearly twice as many applications in the
first month of 2012 compared with the same period in 2011. All of that increase is from decisions
ruling applications inadmissible or striking them out; the number of full judgments issued by the
Court actually declined from year to year. This indicates an effort to ease the Court’s backlog. On
the other hand, there are still over 152,000 pending cases. Although the number of dispositions
increased year to year, the Court’s backlog increased by about 1,000 cases per month. See Analysis
of Statistics 2011, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (Apr. 25, 2013) and Statistics 1/1Both available at
31/8/2012, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 25, 2013).
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/Statistical+data/.
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redound to the benefit of traditional IP rights holders. A mandate to
protect traditional knowledge could benefit groups that presently do not
own IP rights. Similarly, an expansion of moral rights would favor
authors over copyright owners, but this would still leave the problem of
clogging an already backlogged court.
B.

Expanding Rights by Affirmative Obligation

The Von Hannover case signals a potential expansion of rights in
another way, by imposing obligations beyond the negative requirement
that a government may not interfere with fundamental freedoms. No one
connected with the German government intruded upon Princess
Caroline’s privacy. Her complaint was about private parties’ intrusions;
it was a private tort action. Yet the ECHR ruled that the German
government had an affirmative obligation to protect her privacy by
preventing private parties from intruding and affording her a civil
remedy for those intrusions. 216 In the wake of Von Hannover, it has
been argued that the British trademark office’s refusal to register
celebrity names as trademarks for celebrity merchandise—on the
grounds that the public does not view them as trademarks—violates the
Convention’s equal protection guarantee found in Article 14.217 Rather
than limiting the scope of IP rights, such arguments expand them. This
means that the ECHR could mandate a tort scheme if it deems it
necessary to fulfill the requirements of the Convention. This raises
difficult problems of the extent to which such mandates could, perhaps
unintentionally, upset legal regimes that go beyond the immediate right
at issue. Such mandates can have consequences far beyond the
immediate confines of the case before the ECHR. 218 One may question
216. The affirmative nature of this obligation was reaffirmed by the ECHR in subsequent
cases. See, e.g., Mosley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48009/08, ¶ 106 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 10,
2011); Karhuvaara v. Finland, App. No. 53678/00, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 16, 2004).
217. The argument is that Britain is discriminating against celebrities based on status.
218. For a U.S. perspective on this issue, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although he wrote in dissent, and in a
different context, Justice Brennan’s words resonate in this context as well:
The Court requires that the legislative interest in convenience and efficiency be weighed
against the competing interest in judicial independence. In doing so, the Court pits an
interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily understood against one,
the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and thus often seem remote and
not worth the cost in any single case. Thus, while this balancing creates the illusion of
objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result was foreordained, because the balance is
weighted against judicial independence. . . . The danger of the Court’s balancing
approach is, of course, that as individual cases accumulate in which the Court finds that
the short-term benefits of efficiency outweigh the long-term benefits of judicial
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whether such an effort is more appropriately subject to resolution by
legislation, or, in multinational circumstances, by treaty.
C.

Complications for Other Multilateral Agreements

Having a multinational tribunal governed by the Convention
creating IP rights could create a variety of complications for other
multinational agreements and organizations. Consider first the European
Union, all of whose members are adherents to the Convention. As
discussed above, some of the rights that could be inferred from the
Convention already exist in the European Union. However, it was also
noted that basing rights in the Convention could prevent the EU from
altering the scope of those rights (at least where the alteration narrows
those rights) in response to changing conditions. If the Strasbourg court
becomes a pan-European constitutional arbiter of IP law, it may
complicate the position of the EU’s member states. Presently, the courts
of member states can seek guidance from the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) as the ultimate source of guidance on EU law. Although the
ECJ will use the Convention in its decisions, its interpretations may not
correspond to those of the Strasbourg Court. 219 That creates a quandary
for European courts. They are bound by treaty to accept the ECJ’s
interpretation of EU law. 220 But they also are bound by the terms of the
Convention to accept the Strasbourg Court’s judgments. That would
make it difficult for EU members to have certainty about their laws,
even after ECJ review.
A separate, but related problem involves the EU’s attempts to
harmonize and unify its IP laws. Consider, for example, the Community
Trade Mark (“CTM”) system. That system is a centralized system for
the granting of rights good throughout the EU. It is not controlled by
individual member states; the registration system is operated by the
Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market, or OHIM, and
OHIM’s decisions are reviewed by the EU’s Court of First Instance and
the ECJ, although infringement suits are brought in courts of the member
independence, the protections of Article III will be eviscerated.
If one substitutes “the member state’s perception of the general interest” for “judicial
independence,” the basis for the comparison is clear.
219. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible
Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19
DICK. INT’L L. ANN. 301 (2001).
220. See also Murray v. Express Newspapers plc, [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch) [¶ 60-62] (British
courts are bound to follow House of Lords decisions in cases of conflict with European Court of
Human Rights decisions).
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states designated for that purpose. Conceivably, the Strasbourg court
might review member state decisions implementing the CTM system,
even though the EU itself is not part of the Council of Europe.221
A further problem is the effect of ECHR pronouncements on treaty
negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral. The as-yet largely unused
ability to require IP rights to conform to the Convention could create
uncertainty about the ability of Convention signatories to abide by their
commitments. This is ameliorated somewhat by the fact that such intercountry agreements are likely to expand, rather than contract, IP rights.
The ECHR’s entry into this area thus may be consistent with the
negotiation of IP rights treaties. Also, the margin of appreciation could
allow leeway to countries, at least up to a point.
But when IP rights are outside of the realm of traditional IP rights,
such as rights to traditional knowledge, the effect of the ECHR may be
more pronounced. From the perspective of countries that do not favor
expanded rights, it may lessen their leverage in negotiations with
Convention countries. Alternatively, Convention countries will have
less leeway to compromise in negotiations relating to such rights, even if
they might be inclined to do so, because of the need to give effect to
ECHR cases (whether this is a good or bad result may depend on one’s
perspective about the protection of traditional knowledge). Moreover,
the uncertainty inherent in the ECHR’s jurisprudence—margin of
appreciation and fair balance come to mind here—makes it difficult to
predict how future cases might come out. This may make it more
difficult to negotiate even taking cognizance of possible ECHR action.
Moreover, if non-Convention countries are less interested in expanding
certain IP rights (say, moral rights in the United States), then negotiating
a universally accepted regime would be difficult.222
The effect of the ECHR on regimes like TRIPS is more difficult to
evaluate. TRIPS acts as a minimum standard; it is not a global uniform
IP rights regime. An expansion of IP rights, as long as it does not
conflict with other TRIPS concerns such as national treatment or most
favored nation, would not harm the TRIPS regime. In theory, the ECHR
could make it difficult for a country to exercise some of the discretion
granted by TRIPS. For example, Article 31 of TRIPS permits countries

221. Similar questions also could be raised concerning EU law relating to patents, industrial
designs, and copyrights.
222. The usual rule of territoriality would allow countries to have different levels of protection
if they so desired. The problem is limited to situations where countries wish to negotiate a uniform
level of treatment, supplanting territoriality.
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to issue compulsory patent licenses under certain circumstances.223 The
ECHR might rule that the safeguards of TRIPS are insufficiently
protective of patent rights under Article 1 and that compulsory licenses
constitute an unwarranted interference with possessions—patent rights.
Although such a ruling would not put the Convention countries in
violation of TRIPS (TRIPS only permits, but does not compel, the
issuance of licenses), it would undermine an important compromise built
into the international IP rights regime. 224
D.

The “Cheapening” of Human Rights?

The intellectual property applications of the Convention,
particularly the balancing approach of the ECHR in Von Hannover, may
temper expansive notions of IP rights with the need to consider other
societal concerns as boundaries. However, there is a countervailing
possibility. IP rights have long been strongly influenced by “natural
law” elements. That is, IP rights are often seen as the natural entitlement
resulting from one’s intellectual labors. 225 Although in the United States
a utilitarian approach to IP may be more prevalent, 226 there is evidence
of a strong “natural entitlement” strain in our law as well. The landmark
case of International News Service v. Associated Press 227 states this
most forcefully as restricting a defendant that “reap[s] where it has not
sown.” 228 It is also found in the federal trademark dilution statute, which
grants rights to owners of famous trademarks against uses that do not
cause confusion. 229 The scope of moral rights of authors in copyright
law—where Europe has embraced strong protection far more avidly than

223. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), art. 31.
The more general set of patent exceptions is in Article 30. In addition, the Doha Declaration allows
countries additional leeway when deciding to issue such licenses. See Declaration on the TRIPS
agreement and public health, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_
e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm (2001) (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
224. See Helfer, New Innovation, supra note 6, at 36-51 (discussing different possible
paradigms for the ECHR to follow and possible consequences).
225. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5
(Peter Laslett, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
226. By “utilitarian” I am referring to the Patent and Copyright Clause’s first sentence: that
these rights are granted “To promote Science and the useful arts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
227. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
228. Id. at 239.
229. Courts have stated that this protects only mark owners, not consumers. TCPIP Holding
Co., Inc. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). Other courts have posited that
dilution can aid consumers by lowering search costs. See e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509,
511 (7th Cir. 2002).
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the United States—is also evidence of a natural rights approach. 230 The
point is that IP rights holders often seek to restrain what they might
describe as “unfair” uses of their property, not just those that threaten the
utilitarian system supporting the rights—i.e., even when other parts of
society may have an interest in restricting those rights, and when the
incentive to produce new works is not seriously threatened.
Putting this in the context of the Von Hannover and AnheuserBusch cases, a celebrity might argue the “unfairness” of permitting
someone to profit from the image of, or a perceived connection to, the
celebrity. 231 The user may respond by claiming a free speech interest
under Article 10, or the government may claim a right under Article 1,
First Protocol, to regulate property in the general interest. At this point,
the Von Hannover case requires a balancing between the interests at
issue. The danger is that the balancing may be influenced by the
seeming “unfairness” of the offender’s actions (which implicitly
assumes the correctness of the complainant’s case), leading the court to
undervalue the rights of the offender (such as rights of free expression),
especially if they are not in a “traditional” form for those rights.232 The
result would be a precedent that would “cheapen” the value of the right
opposing the IP right, even outside the context of intellectual property.
On a larger scale, the question is whether the ECHR will be
sensitive to the differences between creating or expanding IP rights and
affirmative obligations in other human rights contexts. Without such
sensitivity, precedents set in the IP rights context could have
unpredictable and possibly unwanted effects in other human rights
contexts. 233 Certainly the almost holistic nature of the ECHR’s case law
in this area allows for a fair degree of contextual balancing. How the
230. “Moral rights” give authors of copyrighted works rights of attribution and rights against
uses that would harm their reputations even against the owners of the copyright.
231. See, e.g., Town & Country Properties, Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356 (Va. 1995) (sale of
house identified as formerly owned by football player John Riggins).
232. Cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (2001), where First Amendment
rights were considered in the context of artwork; Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1130
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (rights of publicity and First Amendment relating to use in a video game).
233. Cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (incorporating
right to jury trial in criminal cases should not require incorporating “all of the ancillary rules which
have been or may hereafter be developed incidental to the right to jury trial in the federal courts.”);
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369-375 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that different
standards should apply to the requirement of a unanimous jury in federal and state courts); Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (ruling that the Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous
verdict); id. at 414 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[u]ntil today, it has been universally
understood that a unanimous verdict is an essential element of a Sixth Amendment jury trial.”). The
point is that a lack of sensitivity to context may lead the ECHR to lessen some traditionally
understood rights in order to maintain consistency with cases involving IP rights.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013

51

Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 3
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 3 - WELKOWITZ (DO NOT DELETE)

726

AKRON LAW REVIEW

7/17/2013 10:13 AM

[46:675

Court uses that discretion may determine how human rights will evolve
in the future.
X. CONCLUSION
Although IP rights are not the type of rights typically imagined as
human rights, the case law of the ECHR allows one to imagine using the
Convention to expand IP rights. The Von Hannover cases give us two
important pieces of the IP rights puzzle: the notion of an affirmative
responsibility on the part of member countries to protect against private
incursions on Convention-protected rights, and a limited view of free
expression where privacy and commercial interests are at stake. The
Anheuser-Busch case indicates the possible use of the Convention’s
property rights protection—Article 1 of the First Protocol—as a means
of protecting IP rights. Combine an affirmative obligation to protect
Convention rights from private intrusion with a broad view of “property”
(or “possessions”) and you have the possibility of significant protection
for IP rights emanating from the Convention. As yet, the ECHR’s case
law has not put all of the pieces together to create broad IP protection.
But, as shown by the discussion above, there is case law in addition to
Von Hannover and Anheuser-Busch that suggests the possibility.
The possibility that the Convention could be used to expand IP
rights raises several concerns, not the least of which is the
appropriateness of the ECHR as arbiter of IP rights among the fortyseven members of the Council of Europe. I do not claim that the
possibility is likely or that it is normatively a good thing. The
possibilities raised in this article may never come to pass. But, given the
effect that a leap into the IP rights sphere could have on the enforcement
of human rights, it seems sensible to contemplate the leap and consider
whether to embrace the possibility or prepare to resist it.
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